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 Labor rights and antitrust are back. Vast inequalities of the Gilded Age in the late 1800s 
prompted enactment of landmark labor and antitrust laws in the Progressive and New Deal eras of 
the late 19th and early 20th century.1 Then both labor and antitrust activism faded later in the 20th 
century as more conservative and Law & Economics views increasingly prevailed on labor2 and 
antitrust matters,3 while progressive reformers turned to other areas, such as the civil rights, 
consumer, women’s, and environmental movements of the mid and late 1900s. Now however, with 
recent years’ renewed focus on inequalities of wealth, progressive energy—sometimes with 
 
 
1 See Sections II.B and III. 
 
2 See, e.g., Benjamin Levin, What's Wrong with Police Unions?, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1333, 1390–91 (2020) (in 1947, 
“Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act, which dramatically restricted the power of unions. Unions were interfering 
with the smooth functioning of the economy, opponents claimed, and they were acting as extortionate forces, exacting 
unreasonable rents from employers.”); id. (“federal labor law has stagnated or ‘ossified’”); Sanjukta Paul, Antitrust 
As Allocator of Coordination Rights, 67 UCLA L. REV. 378, 388–89 (2020) (“the Chicago School movement . . . 
focused on attacking labor union power and, eventually, public coordination of markets. . . .  [T]he intellectual arm of 
the midcentury attack on labor unions was formulated around the notion of labor monopoly as a distortion of ideal 
prices--wages—. . . . [and] appeared as the counterpart in economics of the concurrent political assault on American 
unions.”); Michael M. Oswalt, Alt-Bargaining, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 89, 93–94 (2019) (“By the 1960s, labor 
was insular, out-of-step with movement politics, and content to coast on its then-historic size.”) 
 
3 See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust/consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies at War with Each Other, 121 
YALE L.J. 2216, 2233–35 (2012) (the “economic incoherence” of earlier antitrust decisions “came to an end with the 
rise of the ‘Chicago School’ in antitrust economics” in the mid-20th century, as “these scholars demonstrated that 
most marketplace conduct was procompetitive and, indeed, pro-consumer.”); D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust’s “Curse of 
Bigness” Problem, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1259, 1269–70 (2020) (from 1983 to 2006 “a Reagan Administration-led 





support from populist conservatives—has returned to labor4 and antitrust.5 So, this is a good time 
to absorb lessons from the first big eras of labor and antitrust activism.  
 
Accordingly, this Article re-examines labor history of the Progressive and New Deal eras, 
including its antitrust aspects, and shows how those eras produced the labor cartelization and labor 
arbitration that endure to this day. More specifically, this Article shows how employers usually 
defeated labor unions and maintained employment at will, until the Great Depression’s landmark 
labor laws weakened employers’ rights, and encouraged the cartelization of labor, which enabled 
labor unions to negotiate agreements replacing at-will employment with arbitration of employee 
grievances. In other words, labor grievance arbitration was a major victory for union organizers 




4 See, e.g., Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 5 (2016) (“Economic inequality is at its highest point 
since the Gilded Age, when unionization rates were similarly low”); id. at 7–8 (“Since 2012, over two dozen states 
and many more localities have raised their minimum wages[, several] to $15 an hour”); id. (“Just a few years ago, 
increases of this scope and magnitude would have been unthinkable. The wage laws have been accompanied by new 
regulations providing scheduling protection, sick time, and other benefits.”) 
 
At first glance, these seem to be ordinary state and local employment statutes, separate and apart 
from the law that governs collective activity by workers. But the sea change comes in response to a 
range of worker movements, especially the “Fight for $15,” a campaign of low-wage workers 
organized by the Service Employees International Union (SEIU). The express goal of these 
campaigns is not just higher wages but also “a union.” And many of the new laws they have won 
are a product of bargaining.  
 
From the efforts of these social movements, the outline of a new labor law is emerging. 
 
Id. See also William A. Herbert & Alicia McNally, Just Cause Discipline for Social Networking in the New Gilded 
Age: Will the Law Look the Other Way?, 54 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 381, 381 (2016) (“We live and work in an era 
with the moniker of the New Gilded Age to describe the growth in societal income inequality. The appropriateness of 
the designation is not limited to empirical evidence of the growing gap in wealth distribution. Another clear emblem 
of our age is the sharp rise in employment without security”); Sanjukta M. Paul, Uber As for-Profit Hiring Hall: A 
Price-Fixing Paradox and Its Implications, 38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 233, 237 (2017) (arguing that regardless 
of whether “Uber drivers, or other service providers, are employees or independent contractors . . . , they are entitled 
to collective action rights”); id. at 239–40 (in 2015, “the City of Seattle passed an ordinance that grants collective 
bargaining rights to drivers . . . who are classified as independent contractors rather than employees”; “In this the 
ordinance parallels the basic function and structure of the National Labor Relations Act: it provides a mechanism for 
workers to collectively, rather than individually.”) 
 
5 This is “an exciting time for antitrust with new cries from both the left and right to reinvigorate antitrust as a control 
on the abuse of corporate power and its corrosive effect on democratic values.” Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and 
Democracy, 46 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 807, 807–08 (2019). See also A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust Law and Its Critics, 
83 ANTITRUST L.J. 269, 269–270 (2020) (“Antitrust law is back in the news and, perhaps for the first time since 1912, 
in the presidential campaign. The Federal Trade Commission and various committees of Congress have held hearings 
on fundamental antitrust questions. . . . A confluence of four factors seems to have provoked this unrest. The first is a 
rising populism, on both the left and the right, that decries free markets, globalism, and increasing inequality within 







The first section of this Article contrasts labor grievance arbitration—which was extremely 
rare until the 20th century, and remained uncommon until the 1930s—with commercial arbitration, 
which occurred throughout U.S. history. Section II of this Article describes how employers in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries kept labor grievance arbitration rare. In other words, Section II 
shows that pre-1930s employers generally succeeded in maintaining at-will employment by 
refusing to recognize labor unions, let alone agree to unions’ demands to replace at-will 
employment with arbitration of employee grievances. Pre-1930s employer successes in defeating 
unions, Section II explains, were aided by a range of legal doctrines from the law of master-servant 
and tort to the Sherman Antitrust Act and enforcement of workers’ promises not to join unions. 
More broadly, this section shows how 19th century classical liberalism extended in the law through 
the 1920s to impede unionization, and thus the replacement of employment at will with labor 
grievance arbitration.  
 
Section III explains how the Great Depression combined with the early 20th century 
ideological shift from classical liberalism to progressivism to produce massive legal changes in 
the 1930s. The key legal change was legally-encouraged labor cartelization. This was the economic 
policy of the landmark Wagner Act of 1935, the core of what is now known as the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA).6 Section III emphasizes that the NLRA’s legally-encouraged labor 
cartelization produced labor grievance arbitration by empowering unions to extract from 
employers the promises—like firing workers only “for cause”—that create the claims in labor 
grievance arbitration, as well as employers’ promises to resolve those claims in arbitration rather 
than litigation. Section IV briefly concludes.  
 
A companion article, Labor Grievance Arbitration’s Differences,7 discusses how the law 
and practice of labor grievance arbitration differs from other arbitration in the United States. Labor 
Grievance Arbitration’s Differences builds on this Article in showing how those differences arose 
from labor grievance arbitration’s roots in legally-encouraged cartelization. 
 
 
6 National Labor Relations Act., 49 Stat. 449 (1935). The Wagner Act was “the first of three pieces of legislation 
commonly known as that National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).” Michael J. Zimmer & Susan Bisom-Rapp, North 
American Border Wars: The Role of Canadian and American Scholarship in U.S. Labor Law Reform Debates, 30 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J., 1, 6 (2012). 
 
The Wagner Act model was subsequently modified by two major pieces of legislation. The Taft-
Hartley amendments of 1947 shifted the focus of the law from protecting the right of workers to 
organize to protecting the choice of workers whether or not to organize. See Taft-Hartley Act, Pub.L. 
No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (2006)). The 
Landrum-Griffin amendments in 1959 were primarily directed at the protection of members of 
unions vis-à-vis their unions, including a workers Bill of Rights. See Landrum-Griffin Act, Pub. L. 
No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2006)). The Act is 




7 Labor Grievance Arbitration’s Differences will be published in a symposium issue of the Cumberland Law Review, 






I. MUCH LESS LABOR ARBITRATION THAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION BEFORE THE NEW 
DEAL 
 
In contrast to commercial arbitration, which occurred throughout U.S. history, labor 
arbitration was extremely rare until the 20th century, and remained uncommon until the New Deal, 
and specifically 1937, when the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA). While “arbitration” now in the U.S. typically means private (non-
government) adjudication,8 much of the so-called labor arbitration before the NLRA was not 
adjudication at all, but rather was negotiation or mediation. And some of the so-called labor 
arbitration before the NLRA that was adjudication was not private adjudication, but rather 
adjudication by government or quasi-governmental entities. Accordingly, such adjudication was 
not labor arbitration as we understand it but rather early labor regulation, in which government 
intervened in some workplaces, typically in a crisis to prevent or resolve strikes. However, a little 
labor arbitration, in the modern sense of private adjudication, did appear in the U.S. before the 
New Deal, particularly in more progressive industries and regions of the country. 
A.  Commercial Arbitration  
 
 In the 18th and 19th centuries, courts in the United States enforced arbitration awards.9 Until 
the 1920s, however, courts did not enforce executory arbitration agreements, that is, contractual 
promises to resolve disputes in arbitration rather than litigation. As Imre Szalai’s book on U.S. 
arbitration history puts it, “[p]rior to the 1920s, courts in the United States generally refused to 
enforce agreements to arbitrate, and such agreements were revocable,” “as long as an arbitrator 
had not issued an award.”10 While a pre-1920s breach of an executory arbitration agreement might 
 
 
8 See, e.g., STEPHEN J. WARE & ARIANA LEVINSON, PRINCIPLES OF ARBITRATION LAW 1 (2017) (citing authorities); 
Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Collaborative Governance: Emerging Practices and the Incomplete Legal Framework for 
Public and Stakeholder Voice, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 269, 285 (2009) (“Arbitration is private adjudication or private 
judging.”); JOHN S. MURRAY, ALAN SCOTT RAU & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 500 
(2d ed. 1996) (characterizing arbitration as “the process of private  adjudication”); William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, Adjudication As a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 235 (1979) (“[E]ven today much adjudication is 
private (commercial arbitration being an important example).”); THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, PUBLISHER’S VIEW ON 
‘THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION’, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG., May 2003, at 103 (“The court system, of course, 
is almost entirely paid for by taxpayers; whether or not we ever use that public resource, we are subsidizing its use by 
others, including private individuals, government entities or corporations. The costs of alternative private adjudication 
must also be borne by someone”).  
 
9 This was sometimes done using arbitration bonds. See, e.g., James Oldham & Su Jin Kim, Arbitration in America: 
The Early History, 31 LAW & HIST. REV. 241, 244 (2013) (“A representative case from the late eighteenth century. . . 
[is] Borretts v. Patterson, [in which] The parties submitted the dispute to arbitration, and the arbitration bond recited 
the defendant’s agreement to be bound by the decision of named arbitrators, otherwise to forfeit the amount of the 
bond.”). 
 
10 IMRE SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA 9 (2013). See also 






result in a court awarding nominal damages of one dollar or so,11 courts did not enforce executory 
arbitration agreements with the meaningful remedy of court orders staying litigation and 
compelling arbitration.12  
 
Even in the absence of meaningful judicial enforcement though, many parties (often 
merchants in the same trade association) agreed to arbitrate and then resolved disputes in 
arbitration. Commercial arbitration occurred at each stage of U.S. history, as evidenced by the title 
of William Jones’ oft-cited 1956 article, Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York: 
A Brief Survey.13 Although most 18th and 19th century arbitration likely occurred without 
involvement of courts, Jones found in the courts of New York alone about 300 “reports of the 
decisions of courts in cases involving arbitration . . . in the period from 1800 to 1920.”14 These 
cases involved land boundary disputes, construction, sales of goods, “partnership and agency 
agreements with a few employment contracts,” torts “from assault to slander,” fire insurance, and 
miscellaneous other disputes.15 Jones concludes “there was a significant amount of arbitration 
 
 
11 See Munson v. Straits of Dover S. S. Co., 102 F. 926 (2d Cir.1900) (holding that plaintiff, who sought damages in 
the form of lawyer’s fees and costs incurred in defending a lawsuit for breach of agreement to arbitrate, was entitled 
to nominal damages only).  
 
12 See MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 4.3.2.2 (explaining that in the period 1800–
1920, agreements to arbitrate future disputes were not enforced with remedy of specific performance); WESLEY A. 
STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS § 87 (1930). See Kulukundis Shipping Co. S/A v. Amtorg 
Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942). 
 
in the 19th century [U.S.] most courts . . .  continued to use the ‘ouster of jurisdiction’ concept: An 
executory agreement to arbitrate would not be given specific performance or furnish the basis of a 
stay of proceedings on the original cause of action. Nor would it be given effect as a plea in bar, 
except in limited instances, i.e., in the case of an agreement expressly or impliedly making it a 
condition precedent to litigation that there be an award determining some preliminary question of 
subsidiary fact upon which any liability was to be contingent. In the case of broader executory 
agreements, no more than nominal dangers would be given for a breach. 
 
Id. at 984 (citations omitted). “Effective state arbitration statutes were enacted beginning with the New York Statute 
of 1920.” Id. See also Julius Henry Cohen, The Law of Commercial Arbitration and the New York Statute, 31 YALE 
L.J. 147, 153 (1921) (“the remedy in damages must be an ineffective remedy in cases where the arbitration had not 
been actually entered into, for it would seem difficult to prove any damages other than nominal.”) 
 
13 William Catron Jones, Three  Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York: A Brief Survey, 1956 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 193, 194 (1956). 
 
14 Id. at 193, 212-213 (analyzing reports of cases decided by the New York Supreme Court, the New York Court of 
Chancery, the New York Court of Appeals, and the Court of Common Pleas of the City and County of New York). 
 
15 Id. at n. 94: 
 
“Land” cases principally involve boundary disputes; “construction” cases are those involving 
contracts to build various structures; “sales” cases involve the sale of goods; “personal contracts” 







throughout the entire period from 1800 to 1920” and “[i]t seems safe to assume . . . that the number 
of cases being arbitrated was far greater than the number of arbitrations reviewed or considered in 
the courts.”16 Jones reaches this conclusion in part because “use of standard clauses providing for 
the arbitration of disputes that might arise under the contract was frequent in the case of leases, 
insurance policies, and construction contracts, as well as in the case of contracts for the sale of 
goods.”17  
 
Another reason Jones concludes that from 1800 to 1920 far more arbitration in New York 
occurred than the 300 cases prompting courts’ decisions is that the “most of these [300] cases do 
not involve commercial disputes among merchants.”18 Merchant-versus-merchant arbitration—
likely the most common type of arbitration—typically occurred within trade associations, and such 
arbitrations are (in all eras) not likely to appear in courts’ decisions. 
 
[P]arties to trade association arbitration agreements rarely need litigation to 
enforce such agreements or to confirm or vacate trade association arbitration 
awards because . . . self-interest and private pressures usually induce such parties 
to arbitrate and to comply with arbitrators’ decisions. In close-knit trade 
associations, . . . merchant parties to trade association arbitration agreements are 
often “repeat players” in the same industry and thus eager to remain members in 
good standing of their trade association. So they are vulnerable to private 
sanctions—culminating in expulsion from the association—if they challenge the 
arbitration agreement or award.19 
 
Trade association arbitration “managed to function autonomously before” courts enforced 
executory arbitration agreements because trade associations controlled their members’ access to 
important customers and thus “were able to inflict sanctions (such as public criticism, fines, and 
suspension or termination of membership)”20 for breach of arbitration agreements. Jones recounts 




everything from assault to slander; “insurance” is chiefly fire insurance; “miscellaneous” is various, 
including claims owing to one who performed detective work for another and bastardy claims; 
“unknown” refers to those cases in which it is impossible to determine from the report of the case 
the subject matter of the dispute. 
 
16 Id. at 213. 
 
17 Id. at 214. 
 
18 Id. at 213. 
 
19 STEPHEN J. WARE & ALAN SCOTT RAU, ARBITRATION 33 (4th ed. 2020). 
 
20 C.J.W. Baaij, Hiding in Plain Sight: The Power of Public Governance in International Arbitration, 60 HARV. INT’L 






merchants started to organize according to the commodity in which they dealt. In 
each of these organizations there was provision for the arbitration of disputes 
among its members. 
 
The first of these was the New York Stock Exchange. . . . In its first constitution in 
1817, . . . there was provision for arbitration of disputes among members. There 
has continued to be arbitration up to the present day. . . . 
 
Another exchange which had arbitration from an early period was the New York 
Produce Exchange. . . . 
 
Other exchanges were formed as the century wore on, such as the Cotton Exchange 
in 1871, the Mercantile Exchange in 1882, and the New York Coffee and Sugar 
Exchange in 1885. All had provisions for arbitration in their charters. 
 
In addition to exchanges where merchants dealing in a particular commodity could 
deal with each other, merchants engaged in the same trade began, towards the end 
of the [19th] century, to organize into associations for the advancement of the 
interests of that trade. These associations made various efforts to regulate the 
particular trade, such as establishing standard grades and form contracts. Many of 
them also provided in their bylaws for the arbitration, sometimes compulsory, of 
disputes among members. 
 
It is believed that this development of arbitration both within exchanges, and 
especially within trade associations, has continued to increase to the present day. 
Such, at any rate, is the conclusion towards which the research that the University 
of Chicago Law School is presently undertaking seems to be tending.21 
 
The last sentence of that passage apparently references Soia Mentchikoff’s long-influential 1961 
article, Commercial Arbitration,22 which details her “empirical study of trade association 
arbitration and her comparison of such industry-specific arbitration, with the more general 
commercial arbitration exemplified by the American Arbitration Association (AAA).”23 
 
While commercial arbitration from 1800-1920 was especially prevalent in New York, 
many arbitration cases from around the country during those years are cited in Wesley Sturges’ 
 
 
21 Jones, supra note 13, at 217-18. 
 
22 Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1961).   
 
23 Stephen J. Ware, Private Ordering and Commercial Arbitration: Lasting Lessons from Mentschikoff, 2019 J. OF 






1930 treatise, Commercial Arbitration and Awards.24 In sum, despite pre-1920s courts’ refusal to 
enforce executory arbitration agreements, commercial arbitration occurred with some frequency 
at each stage of U.S. history. This longstanding prevalence of commercial arbitration was largely 
due to commercial parties often preferring arbitration to litigation, and to private (often trade 
association) enforcement of arbitration agreements. These factors were, in contrast, largely absent 
in the labor context. The next subsection shows that labor grievance arbitration was extremely rare 
until the 20th century, and remained uncommon until the 1930s. And the rest of this Article shows 
why: employers nearly always resist recognizing labor unions, let alone agree to unions’ demands 
to replace at-will employment with arbitration of employee grievances. Employers were largely 
successful in this resistance, until the New Deal’s legally-encouraged labor cartelization pressured 
employers into labor grievance arbitration.  
B.  Labor Grievance Arbitration was Uncommon Before the New Deal 
1. Different Meanings of Labor “Arbitration” in the 1800s 
 
While a significant amount of commercial arbitration occurred at each stage of U.S. 
history, labor arbitration was extremely rare until the 20th century. Although arbitration now 
typically means private (non-government) adjudication,25 most so-called labor arbitration before 
1900 was not adjudication at all, but rather was negotiation or mediation. And some of the so-
called labor arbitration before 1900 that was adjudication was not private adjudication, but rather 
adjudication by government or quasi-governmental entities. Such adjudication was not labor 
arbitration but rather an early form of labor regulation, that is, a form of government intervention 
in some workplaces, often deployed by elected officials in a crisis to prevent or resolve strikes.  
 
Although a founder of the American Arbitration Association26 wrote that “[o]ne of the first 
disputes submitted to the earliest known American arbitration tribunal, organized in 1786 . . ., 
involved the wages of seamen,”27 and another history says “the first mention of arbitration in labor 
 
 
24 WESLEY A. STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS (1930). See also Sabra A. Jones, Historical 
Development of Commercial Arbitration in the United States, 12 MINN. L. REV. 240, 248 (1928) (“In the United States 
in 1916 there were about 6,000 commercial, industrial, and trading organizations. . . . In the sixth edition of 
‘Commercial Industrial Organizations of the United States’ we find approximately 9,000 organizations, covering 
national, international, state, and local areas. Of these probably 200, seeing the practicability of arbitration, made their 
own rules on arbitration and in many, if not most instances, proceeded independently of the state statutes. Especially 
was this true of the associations with a national or larger scope.”). 
 
25 See supra note 8.  
 
26 Sandra K. Partridge, Frances Kellor and the American Arbitration Association, 67 DISP. RESOL. J., 1, 16, 17 (2012). 
 
27 FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION, ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 4 (1948). See also 
KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM: LABOR, THE LAW, AND LIBERAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 185 
(1991) (arbitration proceedings “In colonial America . . . had been widely used to determine compensation in 






matters in this country occurred” as early as 1829,28 such statements, devoid of context, can 
mislead. As legal historians have long cautioned, “it is difficult to trace the beginnings of labor 
arbitration in the United States because the term has been used to connote quite different things.”29 
While arbitration in the United States now typically means private (non-government) 
adjudication,30 in the labor context of the 1800s, arbitration “[i]n its earliest stage . . . meant what 
we would now call ‘collective bargaining,’ and at subsequent stages it often meant what we would 
now call either ‘mediation’ or ‘conciliation.’”31 So, although 19th century labor unions sought, as 
the Knights of Labor put it, “to persuade all employers to agree to arbitrate all differences which 
may arise between them and their employees, in order that . . . strikes may be rendered unnecessary, 
the ‘arbitration’ advocated was merely union recognition by employers to the extent of 
negotiations and agreements on conditions of employment.”32 “For most of the nineteenth century, 
‘arbitration’ was interchangeably described as negotiation undertaken in a conciliatory spirit, 
adjudication by a joint labor management body, and referral to a neutral third party.”33 
 
Some of that “referral to a neutral third party” apparently was labor arbitration as we now 
understand it—private adjudication, albeit pursuant to a post-dispute (rather than pre-dispute) 
arbitration agreement. Dennis Nolan and Roger Abrams write:  
 
One of the first recorded cases involving arbitration of collective bargaining 
disputes by neutral outsiders took place in 1871. The Pennsylvania anthracite coal 
mining industry and union selected Judge William Elwell to settle disputes 
concerning interference with the works and the firing of workers because of their 
union connections. Holding that both sides had erred, the arbitrator’s decision must 




28 In fact, “the first mention of arbitration in labor matters in this country occurred in the Constitution of the 
Journeymen Cabinet-Makers of the City of Philadelphia in 1829.” EDWIN E. WITTE, HISTORICAL SURVEY OF LABOR 
ARBITRATION (1953). 
 
29 R. W. Fleming, Reflections on the Nature of Labor Arbitration, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1245, 1247 (1963) (quoting 
Witte). 
 
30 See supra note 8.  
 
31 Fleming, supra note 29, at 1247; WITTE, supra note 28, at 4. 
 
32 WITTE, supra note 28, at 6. According to a 1983 assessment by labor arbitration scholars Dennis Nolan and Roger 
Abrams, “no definitive history of labor arbitration in the United States has yet been written,” but Witte’s monograph 
was “the standard work to which all students of the subject must refer.” Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, American 
Labor Arbitration: The Early Years, 35 FLA. L. REV. 373, 374 (1983). Witte was “a University of Wisconsin economist 
steeped in that state’s progressive politics,” and called “the father of Social Security.” Patrick J. Kiger, Edwin E. Witte, 
AARP, https://www.aarp.org/politics-society/history/champions-of-aging-photos/older-american-edwin-witte-
father-social-security/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2020). 
 






Three years later another judge was selected to arbitrate a wage rate dispute 
in the Ohio coal industry.34 
 
If these were in fact examples of labor arbitration as we now understand it, (private adjudication), 
then these 19th century labor arbitrations were extremely rare exceptions in an era almost totally 
devoid of labor arbitration. In other words, labor grievance arbitration replacing at-will 
employment had not yet occurred in the 19th century because nearly all employers refused to 
recognize labor unions or to form enforceable agreements replacing at-will employment with 
arbitration of employee grievances. Such agreements would not come until the 1900s, and not in 
large numbers until 1930s legislation gave cartel powers to unions and thus pressured employers 
to contract with unions. 
 
  While labor grievance arbitration was virtually non-existent in the 1800s, what did occur 
in the late 1800s was the advent of state labor boards. While often called “boards of arbitration,”35 
most of what these state labor boards did was mediation, not adjudication.36 And even when state 
labor boards adjudicated, (usually ineffectively,37) they were not providing private adjudication 
(arbitration, as we know understand it,) because they were generally appointed by governmental 
bodies, such as courts.38 By contrast, commercial arbitration throughout the 1800s was truly 
private adjudication—generally conducted by private arbitrators selected ad hoc by the parties or 
provided, not by government, but by a private trade association.39 So rather than think of 19th 
century state labor boards as early labor arbitration, we might better see them as early labor 
regulation, in which government intervened in some workplaces, often in a crisis to prevent or 
resolve strikes.40  
 
 
34 Id. at 379. 
 
35 Id. at 380-81; WITTE, supra note 28, at 6. 
 
36 WITTE, supra note 28, at 6. 
 
37 State labor boards had a “general record of ineffectiveness,” according to Witte, supra note 28, at 12. Concurring, 
Nolan and Abrams write: “Other statutes established permanent arbitration boards, the majority of which never 
functioned. Of those that did, many quickly sank into obscurity.” Nolan & Abrams, supra note 32, at 381. 
 
38 WITTE, supra note 28, at 6. 
 
39 See supra Section I.A. 
 
40 Nineteenth century state labor boards’ ad hoc government intervention into particular workplaces may be contrasted 
with today’s more systemic government regulation by agency rulemaking and administrative adjudication. Such 
systemic government regulation of the workplace emanates from the National Labor Relations Board, Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and other federal and state 
agencies. But federal workplace regulation continues to include an ad hoc component much like the 19th century state 
labor boards—the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. It refers to its mediators’ “critical ‘firefighter’ function, 
arriving at the last moment to assist the parties in resolving a contract dispute.” Federal Mediation & Conciliation 
Service, Building Labor-Management Relationships, 







The federal government similarly responded to strikes in important industries by 
encouraging “arbitration” to restore or maintain labor peace, and thus production, in those 
industries. “Reacting to a drastic increase in strikes, President Grover Cleveland recommended to 
Congress in 1886 the creation of a permanent board for voluntary arbitration of railroad labor 
disputes. Instead Congress passed the Arbitration Act of 1888, providing for ad hoc arbitration 
boards which parties could use if they so agreed.”41 However, “the voluntary arbitration provisions 
of this act were not utilized even once during the ten years that it was in effect.”42 After the Pullman 
strike “crippled the American railroad network in 1894,”43 Congress enacted the Erdman Act of 
1898. It obligated federal officials  
 
on the request of at least one of the [railway] parties, to attempt to settle through 
mediation any existing or threatened labor dispute. The act further provided for 
arbitration, on agreement of both parties, by an ad hoc board composed of a 
representative of each side and a third person agreed upon by these representatives, 
or appointed, in the event of their failure to agree, by the two federal officials having 
primary responsibility for the administration of the Act. 
 
Soon after the passage of the Erdman Act, the Railroad Trainmen invoked 
the law in connection with a dispute involving switching service in the Pittsburgh 
area. The [U.S. Government’s] Commissioner of Labor and the Chairman of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission promptly offered their services as mediators. 
These services were declined by the railroads with a statement that wages were 
such a vital matter to them that they could not accept outside intervention. 
Thereafter no further attempt to use the Erdman Act was made until late in 1906. 44 
 
From 1906 until 1913, seven “arbitrations” occurred under the Erdman Act, but as Nolan and 
Abrams explain, “[t]he two arbitrators selected by the parties seldom agreed as to the third. As a 
result, the task of choosing the third arbitrator generally devolved upon the Commissioner of Labor 
and the Chairman of the ICC.”45 So these so-called “arbitrations” were, not private adjudication, 
as we define arbitration today, but crucially governmental.  
 
 
41 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 32, at 382. 
 
42 WITTE, supra note 28, at 8–9. 
 
43 Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American Law, 1880-1930, 66 TEX. L. REV. 919, 950 (1988). 
 
44 WITTE, supra note 28, at 10. “Some demand was expressed in labor circles for legislation to compel employers to 
arbitrate. . . . But Samuel Gompers came out strongly against compulsory arbitration . . . [and] [h]is position was 
officially adopted by the American Federation of Labor . . . , [which] declared itself in favor of agreements with 
employers on conditions of employment and also of voluntary arbitration, but totally in opposition to compulsory 
arbitration— a position from which it has not deviated since.” Id. 
 







Similar to railroads, other industries around 1900 sent a few labor disputes to what was 
called “arbitration,” but even some of those few were not private adjudication because government 
officials served as, or appointed, the “arbitrators.” For instance, what Edwin Witte calls “the most 
famous of all arbitration cases” “was the settlement by arbitration of the anthracite coal strike of 
1902.”46 The coal companies “absolutely refused to deal with the union,”47 and the strike “of more 
than five months’ duration aroused a vast amount of public concern.”48 “After the strike had 
continued for some time with no prospect of settlement, President Theodore Roosevelt threatened 
to have the United States Army take over the mines and operate them as a receivership. The mine 
owners bowed to the pressure and asked the President to establish a strike commission.”49  
 
J. Pierpont Morgan finally acceded to the suggestion that all issues be submitted for 
settlement to a board to be appointed by the President, all of whose members should 
represent the public. The Anthracite Coal Strike Commission, after months of 
hearings, came up with an award in which the union failed to win recognition but 
did secure its major economic demand, namely, a basic nine-hour day at the same 
pay as for the prior ten-hour day. The award also provided for the establishment of 
grievance machinery and for a permanent bipartisan Anthracite Conciliation Board 
to interpret the award in cases of dispute. . . .  
. . . 
In twenty-five cases in the first nine years of the functioning of the board, . . . a 
decision had to be made by an umpire. In all but one of these cases the umpire was 
the United States Commissioner of Labor.50 
 
Decisions by the United States Commissioner of Labor are plainly governmental, rather than 
private adjudication, and thus not arbitration as we now understand it. Instead, the Anthracite 
Conciliation Board is—like the earlier-discussed state labor boards and the railroad interventions 
of the Commissioner of Labor and ICC Chair—better understood as early labor regulation, by 
which government intervened in some workplaces, often in a crisis to prevent or resolve strikes.  
 
Such governmental regulation by the federal government coming earlier to railroads and 
coal than to other industries fits the importance—including importance to interstate commerce—
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of railroads and coal in that era.51 So reducing rail and coal strikes understandably concerned 
federal officials and the broader public. Federal government efforts to regulate these industries 
grew along with growing public “[s]entiment for restrictions upon the right to strike, at least on 
the railroads.”52 Accordingly, in a renewed federal effort to prevent or resolve railroad strikes, the 
Newlands Act of 1913 established a Board of Mediation and Conciliation. Although Witte says 
the Board was “instrumental in bringing about settlements through arbitration in twenty-one 
cases,” this so-called “arbitration” was again not private adjudication, but rather, as Witte 
acknowledges, “an independent permanent government agency.”53 Moreover, “the prestige of the 
agency waned after it had to appeal twice in the first three years of its existence to the President to 
prevent threatened strikes.”54 In 1916, on the eve of a nationwide railroad strike, President Wilson  
 
called in representatives of the parties and recommended the establishment of a 
basic eight hour day for train service employees. . . . When the carriers refused to 
go along, the President recommended that Congress pass a law to carry out his 
recommendations. . . . Congress promptly passed the Adamson Act, which served 
to avert the threatened nation-wide strike.55  
 
In short, the so-called labor “arbitration” that was by World War I “very popular with the general 
public,” was not private adjudication, but government regulation—and sometimes even 
presidential intervention—“for the settlement of strikes or threatened strikes.”56  
 
Similar government intervention occurred during the First World War and in the 1920s. 
Witte reports that “[r]elative to the number of industrial workers, the number of strikes and the 
man-days lost through strikes from 1916 to 1919 were the greatest in all our history.”57 During 
these war years, the federal government established “[m]ore than a dozen new labor dispute 
adjustment agencies” to mediate labor disputes. “[W]hen mediation failed to bring about a 
settlement, the adjustment boards passed on the merits of the dispute and entered awards. When 
necessary, indirect methods of compulsion were resorted to by the Government to secure 
 
 
51 Coal provided roughly 70% of the nation’s energy at the time. See Sean Patrick Adams, The US Coal Industry in 
the Nineteenth Century, ECONOMIC HISTORY ASSOCIATION, (January 2003), https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-us-coal-
industry-in-the-nineteenth-century-2/.    
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compliance.”58 President Wilson created a National War Labor Board with “authority to intervene 
in any labor dispute affecting war production and not within the jurisdiction of a special adjustment 
agency. Adjustment of such disputes was to be sought through mediation or by getting the parties 
to agree to arbitration or, failing in such efforts, to render a decision outlining a basis for 
settlement.” 59 Witte says, “Up to the Armistice, the National War Labor Board rendered eighty-
three decisions, which resembled arbitration awards.” 60 Yet again, this so-called arbitration was 
not arbitration as we know it because it was government, rather than private, adjudication. 
 
After World War I, strikes exploded. “1919 stands out as the worst year for strikes” in U.S. 
history.61 According to Witte, “[p]ublic concern was high over the many serious strikes, and 
compulsory arbitration received more support than ever before.”62 By “compulsory arbitration,” 
Witte means governmentally-mandated. Strong public sentiment against strikes, Witte says, meant 
“the Government necessarily had to bring great pressure upon the parties to settle by arbitration 
strikes seriously alarming to the public. Commissions named by President Wilson arbitrated the 
nationwide bituminous coal strike of 1919 and the threatened anthracite strike of 1920.”63 So here 
again, as earlier, this so-called “arbitration” was not private adjudication but rather government 
intervention in an important industry—perhaps amounting to temporary government regulation of 
wages and working conditions in that industry—in a crisis to prevent or resolve strikes. 
 
 Strikes were such a widespread source of public concern that several states not only 
prohibited strikes but made striking a criminal offence. “The mildest of these was the Colorado 
Disputes Investigation Act” of 1915, which “rendered unlawful strikes in [some] industries, prior 
to investigation and reports by the state industrial commission. This legal restriction was often 
violated, and from 1919 to 1922 several prosecutions” occurred.64 “Much more drastic was the 
Kansas Industrial Relations Court Act of 1920,” under which  
 
Strikes were outlawed under criminal penalties and made subject to prohibition by 
injunction. Compulsory arbitration was provided for all labor disputes in the public 
utility, coal, food, and clothing industries. Enforcement of the law and the 
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59 Id. at 32. 
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61 WITTE, supra note 28, at 30. See also Melvyn Dubofsky, Labor Unrest in the United States, 1906-90, 18 REV. 125, 
126 (1995) https://www.jstor.org/stable/40241326?seq=1  (strikes peaked in 1919 when almost 25% of all private-
sector workers struck). 
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settlement by binding decisions of all labor disputes in the specified industries was 
the function of the Court of Industrial Relations . . . . 
 
The compulsory arbitration statute was in actual operation in Kansas for a 
little more than three very stormy years. The Act was strongly opposed by 
organized labor and openly defied by many unions . . . . Some employers also 
refused to abide by the decisions of the Court, and it was out of one of these cases 
that there came decisions in 1923 and 1924 by the United States Supreme Court 
holding the Kansas act to be unconstitutional.65 
 
Kansas’s attempt to ban strikes in some industries and instead mandate governmental arbitration 
was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court held, because government setting wages in meatpacking 
(or “food preparation”) unconstitutionally “deprives [the employer] of its property and liberty of 
contract without due process of law.”66 In contrast, the Court distinguished industries, such as 
railroads, “where fear of monopoly prompted, and was held to justify, regulation of rates.”67 
 
In sum, labor arbitration as we know it—private adjudication—was extremely rare in the 
19th century, and much of what was called “arbitration” was actually negotiation, mediation, or 
governmental adjudication. In the 1800s and early 1900s, much so-called labor arbitration was 
actually early labor regulation, that is, government intervention in important industries, often to 
prevent or resolve strikes.  
2.  Labor Grievance Arbitration Still Uncommon in the Early 1900s 
 
 While private adjudication of labor disputes, as noted above, may have occurred in a few 
extremely rare 19th century instances, the more recognize-able beginnings of labor grievance 
arbitration as the private adjudication we know occurred in the early 1900s. This is when 
employers began to recognize unions, and to form arbitration agreements with them. Nolan and 
Abrams write that the “first major newspaper industry agreement incorporating an arbitration 
provision” was signed in 1901,68 and “hailed by” David Weiss, a member of the International 
 
 
65 Id. at 41 (discussing Kansas Industrial Relations Act (Laws 1920, c. 29)). 
 
66 Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 544 (1923). “The power to regulate a business 
affected with a public interest extends to fixing wages and terms of employment to secure continuity of operation.” 
Id. at 535. “But never has regulation of food preparation been extended to fixing wages or the prices to the public, as 
in the cases [relied on by the state] where fear of monopoly prompted, and was held to justify, regulation of rates.” Id. 
at 538.  
 
67 Id. at 538 (citing Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917), which held that Congress could prescribe wages temporarily 
for railroads). 
 






Typographical Union, “as ‘the genesis of industrial arbitration agreements in the United States.’”69 
In the 1910s, strike settlements in the clothing industries led many employers to recognize unions 
and agree to arbitrate employee grievances. For instance, “a great strike in the New York cloak 
and suit industry in 1910” was settled “very largely through the efforts of” progressive icon and 
future Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, who “for four years . . . served as the unpaid, part-
time chairman of the arbitration board under this agreement.”70 Labor arbitration agreements in 
various parts of the clothing industries spread to other major cities over the next few years.71 In 
addition, “the American Association of Street Railway Employees included arbitration clauses in 
its collective agreements early in the [20th] century,” and “[i]n 1917, the Actor’s Equity 
Association negotiated an arbitration clause in its first contract.”72  
 
“In short, little activity before World War I could be characterized as modern grievance 
arbitration, but the groundwork had been laid.”73 The American Federation of Labor grew tenfold 
from 1898 to 1919.74 In 1913, the U.S. Department of Labor came into existence.75 However, after 
World War I, unionism and the AFL’s membership declined.76 During the post-World War I “red 
scare,” coinciding with the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, many U.S. “labor radicals, pacifists, 
socialists, and other left-wingers [were] jailed or deported.”77 Deportation is quite relevant as “[b]y 
 
 
69 Id. (quoting David Weiss, History of Arbitration in American Newspaper Publishing Industry, 17 MONTHLY LAB. 
REV. 19, 19 (1923)). 
 
70 WITTE, supra note 28, at 24. 
 
71 Id. at 23–26. “During the 1910’s and 1920’s, the [Amalgamated Clothing Workers and the International Ladies’ 
Garment Workers’ Union] went further than any other of the nation’s unions in forging the kind of collective 
bargaining arrangements that would come to characterize ‘modern’ labor-management relations under the 1935 
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act.” William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1195 (1989). 
 
72 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 32, at 400. See also V.B. Dubal, The Drive to Precarity: A Political History of Work, 
Regulation, & Labor Advocacy in San Francisco’s Taxi & Uber Economies, 38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 73, 82 
(2017) (“by 1919, 100% of the workforce was unionized”). 
 
73 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 32, at 400. 
 
74 ROBERT H. ZIEGER & GILBERT J. GALL, AMERICAN WORKERS, AMERICAN UNIONS: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 19 
(3d ed. 2002) (the American Federation of Labor grew from under 300,000 members in 1898 to over four million by 
1919). 
 
75 WITTE, supra note 28, at 31-32.  
 
76 WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT, 98 (1991) (“Wartime 
government policy from 1917 to 1919 opened the door to unions in places and industries hitherto closed. By the mid 
1920s, however, open-shop drives, supported by unprecedented numbers of anti-strike decrees, had robbed the [AFL] 
of over 25 percent of its total 1919 membership and half of its wartime gains.”)  
 
77 David E. Bernstein, From Progressivism to Modern Liberalism: Louis D. Brandeis As A Transitional Figure in 






1910, twenty-two percent of the U.S. labor force was foreign-born,”78 and many labor activists 
were immigrants.79 
 
While the newspaper, clothing, construction, and railroad industries moved toward 
unionization and arbitration in the early 20th century, most other industries did not, and overall 
union membership declined in the conservative 1920s. As Witte recounts: 
 
Before the great depression, labor-management agreements existed in nearly all 
unionized industries. On the railroads, in the building trades, in clothing 
manufacture, in printing, and in a few smaller industries, union contracts were 
common. [In contrast, t]he mass-production industries, in fact nearly all 
manufacturing as well as substantially all service industries, distribution, retailing, 
and office employments, were almost completely unorganized. In coal and metal 
mining, unionism earlier had been very strong, but was greatly weakened in the 
nineteen-twenties. Street railway transportation was often unionized, but trucking 
and taxi and bus service were organized only in some of the larger cities.80   
 
Witte concludes that “[f]rom above five million in 1919, union membership decreased to less than 
three million in 1933.”81 During the business-oriented era of the three Republican presidencies 
from 1920 through 1933, the number of strikes plummeted.82 These were such lean years for labor 
unions that Professor Irving Bernstein’s book is entitled, The Lean Years: A History of the 
American Worker 1920-1933.83  
 
 Nevertheless, “[f]rom the end of World War I to the coming of the New Deal,” R.W. 
Fleming writes, “there appears to have been a modest, but unspectacular, growth in grievance 
 
 
78 David E. Bernstein & Thomas C. Leonard, Excluding Unfit Workers: Social Control Versus Social Justice in the 
Age of Economic Reform, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 179 (2009). 
 
79 Steven R. Morrison, Membership Crime vs. The Right to Assemble, 48 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 729, 735 (2015) 
(immigrants “created institutions like the Knights of Labor, political labor parties, and trade unions”); José A. 
Bracamonte, The National Labor Relations Act and Undocumented Workers: The De-Alienation of American Labor, 
21 SAN. DIEGO L. REV. 29, 32 (1983) (“immigrants were assailed for organizing unions which were considered 
inimical to the American ‘way of life.’”).  
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82 Ahmed White, Its Own Dubious Battle: The Impossible Defense of an Effective Right to Strike, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 
1065, 1081 (2018) (“the annual number of strikes, which had reached well over 3000 a year in the 1910s, plummeted, 
ranging from about 600 to 1000 a year in the second part of the 1920s and the early years of the 1930s.”). 
 







arbitration.”84 However, some of this growth came from the government-mandated arbitration of 
the Railway Labor Act of 1926 (RLA). Although, as discussed above, Kansas’s attempt to ban 
strikes in some industries and instead mandate arbitration was held unconstitutional after just a 
few controversial years,85 the RLA is an analogous federal statute from that era, and it has now 
endured nearly a century. The RLA bans strikes in some transportation industries and instead 
mandates arbitration.86 “The RLA creates a National Railroad Adjustment Board consisting of 
representatives selected by the employers and representatives selected by the employees’ labor 
unions. The RLA requires employers and unions to submit certain disputes to the Adjustment 
Board for decision.”87  
II. HOW PRE-1930S EMPLOYERS LARGELY DEFEATED LABOR UNIONS’ EFFORTS TO REPLACE 
AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT WITH ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYEE GRIEVANCES 
 
Section I of this Article showed that labor arbitration was virtually non-existent before 
1900 and that labor grievance arbitration remained uncommon through the 1920s. In other words, 
employment at will was not often replaced by arbitration of employee grievances before the 1930s. 
This Section shows that pre-1930s employers generally succeeded in maintaining at-will 
employment by refusing to recognize labor unions, let alone agree to unions’ demands to replace 
at-will employment with arbitration of employee grievances. Pre-1930s employer successes in 
defeating unions, this Section explains, were aided by a range of legal doctrines from the law of 
master-servant and tort to the Sherman Antitrust Act and enforcement of workers’ promises not to 
join unions. More broadly, this Section shows how 19th century classical liberalism extended in 
the law through the 1920s to impede unionization, and thus the replacement of employment at will 
with labor grievance arbitration. 




84 Fleming, supra note 29, at 1248. See also Nolan & Abrams, supra note 32, at, 400 (noting “although one study 
estimated that fifty-five percent of the collective agreements negotiated between 1875 and 1920 contained arbitration 
clauses this figure must be qualified because few labor agreements existed then, the percentage of the work force 
covered by arbitration clauses was quite small.”). 
 
85 See supra note 65 (discussing Kansas Industrial Relations Court Act of 1920). 
 
86 “The most significant change made by the Railway Labor Act in handling grievances is that strikes over certain 
grievance disputes are banned. The Supreme Court interpreted this provision as prohibiting strikes over ‘minor’ 
disputes, and permitting enforcement by injunction when necessary.” Nolan & Abrams, supra note 32, at 387-88. 
 
87 STEPHEN J. WARE, PRINCIPLES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 263 (3d ed. 2016) (citing 45 U.S.C. § 153(a), 
(i)). Judicial “review of the awards is very limited.” See WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 8, at 204 (citing ELKOURI & 






While few contemporary employees are legally-obligated to remain with their employers 
for a period of time,88 before and into the 19th century many workers were “servants” more tied to 
their “masters.” Some of these jobs “were often quite personal and intimate,” such as “the 
employment relations between masters and their domestic servants.”89 The “status relations” of 
master-servant “were governed by a well-developed set of legal rules. For example, a master was 
obliged to provide food, shelter, and security for his servant, while the servant in return was 
expected to provide personal service. Servants were legally identified with their masters, and so 
possessed little individuality and personal independence.”90  
 
If such an employee (“servant”) quit that employer (“master”), before completing the 
agreed period of employment, to take a different job then the master might well have a successful 
tort action against the person(s) who enticed the servant to leave.91   
 
The law strengthened a master’s control over his servants by preventing others from 
interfering with the relationship during the term of service. An action for enticement 
was available against a third party who persuaded a servant to leave his employment 
before the expiration of his term, while an action for harboring could be lodged 
against any person who continued to employ a runaway servant after receiving 
notice of his premature departure from another servitude. These suits sought to deny 
servants any opportunity for alternative employment during the term of their 
service. Unable to feed themselves or their families if they left their masters, 
servants had little choice but to obey them for the duration of the agreement.92 
 
The 1853 English case of Lumley v. Gye93 expanded this tort beyond household servants to a 
famous opera singer. “‘Miss Wagner, an opera singer of some distinction, had agreed with the 
 
 
88 Stuart Lichten and Eric M. Fink, “Just When I Thought I Was Out . . .”: Post-Employment Repayment Obligations, 
25 WASH. & LEE. J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 51, 52 (2018) (“The common law doctrine of ‘employment at will’ has 
dominated U.S. employment law for over a century. Pursuant to this concept, an employer may discharge an employee 
at any time for any reason . . . An employee may similarly resign at any time for any reason . . . .”); Richard A. Lord, 
The At-Will Relationship in the 21st Century: A Consideration of Consideration, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 707, 773–74 
(2006) (“The traditional rule that the at-will employment relationship may be terminated by either the employer or the 
employee, at any time, for any reason or for no reason, with or without notice, continues to be the rule in almost all 
American jurisdictions.”).  
 
89 John T. Nockleby, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations in the Nineteenth Century: The Transformation 
of Property, Contract, and Tort, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1513 (1980). 
 
90 Id. at 1514-15. 
 
91 MELVILLE M. BIGELOW. ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF TORTS FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS 139 (2d ed. 1882) (“A owes 
to B the duty to forbear to procure or cause C to deprive B of his or her (C’s) service . . . . The law of enticement and 
seduction gives a right of redress . . . for wrongfully interrupting the relation of master and servant . . . .”). 
 
92 Nockleby, supra note 89, at 1514. 
 






plaintiff to sing in his theatre for a definite term and during that term not to sing elsewhere,’ but 
the defendant, ‘intending to injure plaintiff,’ before the expiration of the term, enticed and procured 
Miss Wagner to refuse to perform, as a result of which Miss Wagner failed to sing for the 
plaintiff.”94 In Lumley v. Gye’s companion case, Lumley v. Wagner, the court enjoined Wagner 
from “singing at any competing music hall for the term of the contract.”95 Lumley’s expansion of 
“the action of enticement” beyond “employment relationships that were domestic, personal, and 
paternalistic,” occurred as industrialization shifted employment from “the paternalistic master-
servant relation of the eighteenth century [to] the depersonalized industrial employment contract 
of the late nineteenth century.”96  
 
From England, the tort of enticement emigrated to the United States,97 and law in most 
states followed Lumley, so “the distinction between domestic servants and other employees 
gradually disappeared from the law of third-party inducement; the enticement action became 
available to all employers whose employees were persuaded to leave their service.”98 This meant 
employers could use the enticement action against third parties “enticing industrial employees and 
other workers” to leave their jobs.99 Thus, John Nockleby explains, in 1871 “the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court extended the enticement action to workers engaged in the manufacture of 




94 Francis Bowes Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARV. L. REV. 663, 667 (1923) (citing Lumley v. Gye, 2 EI, 
and Bl. 216, 231 (1853)). 
 
95 Lea S. VanderVelde, The Gendered Origins of the Lumley Doctrine: Binding Men’s Consciences and Women’s 
Fidelity, 101 YALE L. J. 775, 775 (1992) (“In the familiar case of Lumley v. Wagner, the English Court of Equity held 
that although opera singer Johanna Wagner could not be ordered to perform her contract, she would be enjoined from 
singing at any competing music hall for the term of the contract.”). 
 
96 Nockleby, supra note 89, at 1520. 
 
97 Sayre, supra note 94, at 671 (“From England the doctrine has emigrated to the United States; and although some 
states squarely reject it, the majority accept it as binding law.”) The 1882 edition of Melville M. Bigelow’s Elements 
of the Law of Torts states that to sustain an employment enticement action, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant 
had notice of the existence of an existing master and servant relationship, the defendant interrupted that relationship 
(without consent of the master), and that interruption caused the servant to violate a duty owed to the master. BIGELOW, 
supra note 91, at 140. 
 
98 Nockleby, supra note 89, at 1523. In addition to common-law tort actions, southern states used anti-enticement 
statutes during the late 19th and early 20th centuries to control newly freed black laborers. Shirley Lung, Criminalizing 
Work and Non-Work: The Disciplining of Immigrant and African American Workers, 14 U. MASS. L. REV. 290, 324–
25 (2019). These included statutes that “prohibited an employer from ‘enticing’ away another employer’s laborers and 
statutes that restricted agents who recruited black workers across state lines,” making it a crime to “hire away, or 
induce to leave the service of another, any laborer by offering higher wages or in any other way whatsoever.” Id. at 
331–33. 
 
99 Nockleby, supra note 89, at 1523. 
 






However, some courts held liable for enticement only defendants who induced breach of a 
contract for “exclusive personal services for a specified period of time.”101 These courts held “that 
no action for enticement can be brought where the service was at will”102 because such an 
employee does not breach an employment contract by quitting. For instance, the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts said in Beekman v. Marsters in 1907: 
 
If a defendant by an offer of higher wages induces a laborer who is not under 
contract to enter his (the defendant’s) employ in place of the plaintiff’s, the plaintiff 
is not injured in his legal rights. But it is quite a different thing if the laborer was 
under a contract with the plaintiff for a period which had not expired, and the 
defendant, knowing that, intentionally induced the laborer to leave the plaintiff’s 
employ by an offer of higher wages, to get his (the laborer’s) services for his (the 
defendant’s) benefit.103 
 
Much industrial employment was at-will in the late 18th and early 19th centuries,104 so employers 
could not—in jurisdictions that found no breach by an employee leaving at-will employment—use 
the enticement tort to enjoin union organizers attempting to recruit such employees to leave their 
employers, even if just temporarily, by striking. 
 
Unfortunately for labor union organizers, however, courts broadened the tort from 
“enticement” to “malicious interference.” John Nockleby writes that in the 1881 English Court of 
Appeals held “that ‘malicious interference,’ not ‘enticement,’ provided the foundation for the 
tort,”105 and courts in the United States followed. Significantly for employers’ actions against  
union organizers, “unlike the action of enticement, ‘malicious’ interference did not presuppose 
that the defendant had appropriated the fruits of the contract to himself. Thus, ‘interference’ 
encompassed a broader range of forbidden behavior that conceivably included any intentional act 
that devalued the worth of a plaintiff’s contractual interest regardless of whether the defendant 
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For instance, in the 1896 case of Vegelahn v. Guntner,107 the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court enjoined union organizers from maintaining a picket line outside the plaintiff-
employer’s business.108 The Vegelahn court said the picket or “patrol”: 
 
was maintained as one of the means of carrying out the defendants’ plan, and it was 
used in combination with social pressure, threats of personal injury or unlawful 
harm, and persuasion to break existing contracts. It was thus one means of 
intimidation, indirectly to the plaintiff, and directly to persons actually employed, 
or seeking to be employed, by the plaintiff, and of rendering such employment 
unpleasant or intolerable to such persons. Such an act is an unlawful interference 
with the rights both of employer and of employed. An employer has a right to 
engage all persons who are willing to work for him, at such prices as may be 
mutually agreed upon, and persons employed or seeking employment have a 
corresponding right to enter into or remain in the employment of any person or 
corporation willing to employ them. These rights are secured by the constitution 
itself.109  
 
This passage from Vegelahn shows the court’s understanding of the union’s picket as a tool 
designed to prevent the employer from hiring workers not represented by the union. In other words, 
successful picketing pressures the employer, as elaborated below, to buy labor only from workers 
represented by the union. And Vegelahn exemplifies how pre-1930s employers used the law of 
tort—rooted in the older law of master and servant—to enjoin picketing and thus preserve 
employers’ freedom to buy labor from workers not represented by the union. Consequently, in 
cases like Vegelahn, “between 1890 and 1920, the tort of interference with contractual relations 
became an intellectual battleground corresponding to the daily reality of struggle between labor 
unions and capitalist employers.”110 “In the end,” Nockleby notes, it was the New Deal’s Wagner 
Act “and the creation of the National Labor Relations Board that put an end to much of the 
 
 
107 Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 97, 44 N.E. 1077, 1077 (1896). 
 
108 Nockleby, supra note 89, at 1533 (“While combinations of businessmen that destroyed the livelihood of 
nonmembers were tolerated, unions that inflicted similar harm as a means to increase bargaining power rather than as 
an end were found to have engaged in intimidation and duress. Therefore, in Vegelahn v. Guntner, union members 
were enjoined from establishing a peaceful two-person picket in front of their employer’s business. No contracts were 
breached, but present and prospective employees were allegedly intimidated.”).  
 
109 Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. at 97. 
 
110 Nockleby, supra note 89, at 1529. See also Sanjukta M. Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability for 
Worker Collective Action, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 969, 996 (2016) (“The tort of enticement dominated the courts’ 
regulation of workers’ collective action, and demonstrates the ancient nature of the judicial regulation of labor well 
into the nineteenth century: that action had remained more or less constant for the six centuries prior. The basic 
reasoning was that someone who “enticed” workers (servants) away from their work (or “induce[d] him to leave his 
master”), in this case for the purpose of holding out for higher wages, was liable for damages to the master. Enticement 







controversy over the tort in the employment context.”111 The Wagner Act reduced the relevance 
of this tort of interference because, as discussed in Section III, the Wagner Act encouraged the 
formation of unions and pressured employers to buy labor from workers represented by unions. 
Thus, the Wagner Act greatly reduced the ability of employers to do what the Vegelahn employer 
did—buy labor from workers not represented by the union.    
B. Antitrust Law Prohibiting Cartels, Including Labor Cartels 
 
1. The Sherman Act and the Growth of Labor Injunctions 
Efforts to form effective labor unions were impeded not only by master-servant and tort 
law, but also by antitrust law, which applied to both capital and labor. The “dramatic expansion of 
industrial and commercial enterprise” in the late 1800s “witnessed the intensive concentration of 
industrial capital. Goliath enterprises came to dominate entire industries.”112 In addition to 
concerns about the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a few “robber barons,”113 
the growth of industries with only a few producers led by the end of the 19th century to concerns 
that a monopolist or—through a price-fixing agreement—cartel can profit by raising its price 
above that which sellers in a competitive market would charge.114 (This general view of monopoly 




111 Nockleby, supra note 89, at 1537.  
 
112 Nirej S. Sekhon, Punitive Injunctions, 17 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 175, 207 (2014). 
 
113 Amy Deen Westbrook & David A. Westbrook, Unicorns, Guardians, and the Concentration of the U.S. Equity 
Markets, 96 NEB. L. REV. 688, 693–94, 700 (2018) (“The late nineteenth century was the era of ‘robber barons’ or 
‘titans’--men like J.P. Morgan or Andrew Carnegie . . . Wealth concentration at the turn of the twentieth century was 
extreme: according to a study conducted by G.K. Holmes in 1893, nine percent of American families possessed 
seventy-one percent of the wealth of the country.”); M.H. Hoeflich, Legal Ethics in the Nineteenth Century: The 
“Other Tradition”, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 793, 814–15 (1999) (“The last quarter of the nineteenth century was a period 
in American history marked by the rise of the first great corporate amalgamations in railroads, in oil, and in steel. . . 
And it was the period of the first great ‘robber barons’ who, through their force of will, ingenuity, and lack of morals, 
were able to build vast corporate conglomerates through the manipulation of markets and the laws pertaining to 
them.”); Rebecca Roiphe, Redefining Professionalism, 26 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 193, 211 (2015) (“Every era has 
its villains. In the late nineteenth century, or the Gilded Age, it was the robber barons . . . [I]ndustrial capitalism had 
raced into the modern age after the Civil War and the robber barons were quick to take advantage of a regulatory 
framework that had not yet caught up. They paid their workers poorly and kept them in notoriously dangerous 
conditions. They artificially suppressed prices until they could buy out their competitors and create monopoly rates 
for their wares, at which point they would raise the prices and reap the rewards.”). 
 
114 “In 1890, Alfred Marshall’s Principles of Economics was the first economics treatise to incorporate terms 
like elasticity of demand and marginal revenue in a way that permitted technical descriptions of price and output under 
competition and monopoly. After that, the classical model of ‘perfect competition’ developed fairly quickly, maturing 
in the 1920s.” Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American Law, 1880-1930, 66 TEX. L. REV. 919, 936 
(1988). 
 
115 See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 28-32 (6th ed. 2012); RICHARD A. POSNER, 






While during most of the 19th century, “[t]he common law’s general rule . . . was that 
agreements to fix prices were in restraint of trade, and consequently a court would not enforce 
them,”116 such agreements “were not unlawful in the sense of being criminal or tortious.”117 This 
changed in 1890 when Congress enacted the Sherman Act, which prohibits “[e]very contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.”118 
The Sherman Act “granted the federal government the right to seek injunctions against business 
cartels and even to levy fines or prison sentences against cartel participants.”119 Courts “began 
condemning simple price-fixing agreements” in 1897.120 
 
“During the late nineteenth century, political economists . . . explained how concerted 
activity could be harmful simply because it was carried out by a group that collectively dominated 
some market.”121 They applied this theory first to business cartels and then to labor 
combinations.122 Law treatise writers and courts, Herbert Hovenkamp explains, often followed a 
similar path. “Perhaps the most striking aspect of the labor law literature of the late nineteenth 
century is the similar way in which treatise writers approached combinations of laborers and 
combinations of producers or sellers.”123 At the turn of the 20th century, Hovenkamp goes so far 
to say, “the consumer welfare principle of protecting consumers from higher prices was not merely 
the predominant labor law policy, it was the only policy.”124 Hovenkamp explains that “Beginning 
gradually around 1890, courts began to adopt the theory that labor is a commodity, and that the 
‘labor and skill of the workman’ and the ‘plant of the manufacturer’ are equally property, to which 
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This view of labor “as a commodity to be bought and sold like any other”126 “implied a 
problematic role for unions. If workers were commodity sellers, then unions were cartels of 
commodity sellers, or ‘labor trusts.’”127 Courts held “that labor combinations could be ‘in restraint 
of trade’ under the antitrust laws.”128 The Sherman Act’s application to labor cartels significantly 
increased courts’ use of injunctions, which could “bind thousands of workers,”129 against strikes 
and other union activity. Between 1890, when the Sherman Act was passed, and 1897, lower courts 
found antitrust violations in thirteen reported decisions; one involved a manufacturers’ conspiracy, 
while twelve involved labor union conspiracies.130 In short, “all interested parties immediately 
perceived the [Sherman Act] as a powerful union-busting device.”131 
 
Before the Sherman Act, Hovenkamp writes, “workers had the right to refuse to work, 
either singly or in combination, as long as they neither coerced other employees to join them nor 
forced other businesses to refuse to deal with the struck employer.”132 Hovenkamp found that “no 
American case before the 1890s condemned laborers for the simple act of combining in order to 
increase wages.”133 By contrast, “[a] principal effect of applying the Sherman Act to labor 
combinations” was that courts began “scrutinizing strikes very closely for evidence of the coercion 
of unwilling participants. Moreover, conduct not generally considered coercive in the 1870s and 
1880s, such as simple picketing, became so after the turn of the century.”134  
 
In contrast to cartels of businesses, cartels of unskilled labor may be harder to maintain, 
particularly when employers can, as they often did around 1900, replace “striking unskilled 
laborers” with “carloads of ‘scabs’ [replacement workers] within a day or two after a strike 
 
 
126 James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941, 984–86 (1997) (“From the 1890s to the 
1930s, most courts joined employers in assimilating industrial relations to the narrative model of the commercial 
transaction: rationally self-interested workers would seek to maximize their wages and working conditions by 
exercising their freedom to contract in the labor market. Continuing a middle-class abolitionist tradition, labor was 
viewed as a commodity to be bought and sold like any other.”) 
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fanned the practice.” Sekhon, supra note 112, at 207. 
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began.”135 Consequently, many unions’ strike goals included the “closed shop,” a workplace where 
union membership is a condition of employment. However, this “closed shop campaign tended to 
confirm . . . that the labor movement threatened to monopolize the labor market . . . in a certain 
plant by denying nonunion workers an opportunity to sell their services there.”136 With closed 
shops out of labor’s reach and unskilled laborers on strike easily replaced by other workers, strikes’ 
effectiveness “often required secondary activities that a court might find coercive.”137 
 
For the unions, various kinds of secondary activities were necessary. One 
example is simple picketing, which is intended to intimidate customers and 
nonparticipating employees of the struck employer. These activities also may 
involve more forceful acts—boycotts of those unsympathetic with the strike, such 
as retailers who sell struck goods, and even violence directed at workers who refuse 
to participate. An important but often overlooked fact about some great early labor 
conspiracy cases . . . is that the complainants were not employers seeking to 
discipline unions, but were fellow employees whom union members had attempted 
to exclude from the labor market because of their willingness to work at too low a 
wage.138 
 
Hovenkamp writes that “Violence was of course criminal without regard to any underlying 
conspiracy among laborers and their unions. Nevertheless, striking laborers were inclined to think 
that they had a right, whether moral or legal, to take action against those who would undermine 
their strike.”139 “Most early Sherman Act labor cases involved secondary activities that were 
sufficiently coercive to warrant condemnation even under a common-law standard. These 
activities included union violence or intimidation against others and seizure or physical destruction 
of an employer’s property.”140 “Some courts eventually held that even a simple agreement to strike 
was illegal and enjoinable under the antitrust laws.”141  
 
 In sum, the Sherman Act “crippled organized labor’s use of its chief economic weapons—
strikes and secondary boycotts.”142 “The federal labor injunction proved to be the courts’ ideal 
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weapon for subduing labor activities.”143 “Of the many weapons employed in industrial warfare, 
none has aroused more controversy than the labor injunction. Commencing about 1886, and 
continuing through the 1920’s, injunctions had an important and frequently a decisive effect on 
the outcome of disputes between employers and unions.”144 Opposition to “government by 
injunction” was central to early 20th century progressives and New Dealers, including future 
Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter.145  
 
2. The Clayton Act’s Limited Impact 
The 1912 Democratic Party platform promised to exempt labor from the Sherman Act.146 
Democrats won the presidency and both houses of Congress that year. The new, progressive 
Congress designed the Clayton Act of 1914 to exempt labor organizing from the federal antitrust 
laws.147 Section 6 of the Clayton Act declares: 
 
The labor of human beings is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing 
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and 
operation of labor . . . organizations . . . or to forbid or restrain individual members 
of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor 
shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal 
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under antitrust laws.148 
 
Section 20 of the Clayton Act forbade labor injunctions “in any case between an employer and 
employees, or between employers and employees, or between employees, or between persons 
employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning 
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terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or 
to a property right.”149 However, the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted this language to protect 
only “acts growing out of labor disputes between employees and their immediate employer,” so 
“although labor organizations themselves were not illegal and in some cases strikes also were not, 
secondary boycotts and, in many circumstances, strikes and picketing, remained subject to antitrust 
liability.”150  
 
Consequently, labor injunctions based on antitrust claims continued through the 1920s.151 
An example was the big national strike of railroad workers in 1922. “At the behest of President 
Warren Harding, Attorney General Harry Daugherty sought an injunction against the strike, a court 
granted it, and 2,200 new federal marshals were hired to enforce it. The injunction crushed the 
strike as workers were not only barred from striking but also picketing and assembling near rail 
lines.”152 In the 1927 Supreme Court case of Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters’ 
Ass’n of North America, an employer’s use of non-union labor led the stone cutters union to declare 
a nationwide boycott on the handling of the employer’s “unfair” (non-union) stone.153 The 
employer sought an injunction against the union’s officers to prevent them from ordering their 
members to refrain from working on the non-union stone and from persuading customers and other 
workers to refrain from using the non-union stone.154 While the Seventh Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s refusal to issue the injunction,155 the Supreme Court held the employers “[were] 
entitled to relief by injunction under section 16 of the Clayton Act”156 because “the acts and 
conduct of respondents [union officers] fall within the terms of the [Sherman] Anti-Trust Act.”157 
 
 By the 1920s several states had enacted statutes limiting courts’ labor injunctions. For 
example, Arizona prohibited injunctions “involving or growing out of a dispute concerning the 
terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property or 
 
 
149 29 U.S.C. § 52. 
 
150 Altman, supra note 142, at 143; See also Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Collective Bargaining and Competition: The 
Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 33 (1963). 
 
151 Morris D. Forkosch, The Doctrine of Criminal Conspiracy and Its Modern Application to Labor: II, 40 TEX. L. 
REV. 473, 500 n.143 (1962) (“United States v. Railway Employees, AFL, 283 Fed. 479, 492 (N.D. Ill. 1922) (An 
injunction suit by the government under its general equity powers and also under the Sherman Act’s § 4.)”).  
 
152 Nino C. Monea, Bulwark of Equality: The Jury in America, 122 W. VA. L. REV. 513, 556 (2019). 
 
153 Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters’ Ass’n of North America, 274 U.S. 37, 42–46 (1927).  
 
154 Id. at 42–44.  
 
155 Id. at 41–42.  
 
156 Id. at 55.  
 






to a property right of the party making the application.”158 This Arizona statute also prohibited 
injunctions against persuading others, “by peaceful means,” to terminate their employment or to 
refrain from patronizing a party, typically the employer, to the litigation.159 However, the Supreme 
Court held this statute unconstitutional in the 1921 case of Truax v. Corrigan.160 In sum, a 
conservative Supreme Court combined with many other federal judges willing to issue labor 
injunctions, even when state courts and local officials sided with unionists, to maintain antitrust 
law as a powerful tool against union organizing through the 1920s.  
C. Anti-Union Contracts 
 
Many people use the phrase “yellow-dog contract” to describe a contract in which an 
employee promises not to join or help a labor union.161 This phrase is derogatory, rather than 
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162 As Marion Crain & John Inazu write: 
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and laws of the land and makes himself the truckling, helpless slave of the employer.” Joel I. 
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The 1898 Erdman Act prohibited interstate railroads from using anti-union contracts,164 
but the Supreme Court’s 1908 decision in Adair v. United States,165 “struck down the law as a 
violation of freedom of contract.”166 Adair “rel[ied] heavily on”167 1905’s Lochner v. New York,168 
in which the Supreme Court had similarly held unconstitutional a New York statute capping the 
number of hours bakers could lawfully work. Before 1917, anti-union contracts were apparently 
used only occasionally,169 perhaps because most employers did not much value winning a money 
judgment against a former employee with little property or income.170 But the Supreme Court’s 
1917 decision in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell,171 fueled the growth of anti-union 
contracts by enforcing them, not or not just with money judgments against individual employees, 
but also with injunctions against those attempting to unionize to employees.172 As Matthew Finkin 
writes, the Hitchman Company required its miners “to sign a contract that provided that the 
employee would not join the union or make any effort to unionize. Because the miners held their 
jobs on an at-will basis they could be discharged for joining or supporting a union or for seeking 
collective address to their grievances.”173 The United Mine Workers nevertheless tried to organize 
the workers, which prompted the employer’s case in equity—against certain members of the union 
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as individuals and against one as an officer of the union174—seeking to enjoin the defendants from 
“all attempts to organize the employees while employed under non-union contracts.”175  
 
The Supreme Court upheld, with some modifications, the district court’s order enjoining 
the defendants176 from trying to unionize the mine by “knowingly and willfully bringing about the 
breaking by plaintiff’s employees of contracts of service.”177 The Court also enjoined the 
defendants from “enticing plaintiff’s employees, present or future, to leave plaintiff’s service on 
the ground that plaintiff does not recognize the United Mine Workers of America or runs a non-
union mine.”178 Finally, the Supreme Court enjoined the defendants from “interfering . . . with 
plaintiff’s employees so as knowingly and willfully to bring about the breaking by plaintiff’s 
employees, present and future, of their contracts of service.”179  
 
Hitchman showed that anti-union contracts “could be used by employers to secure 
injunctions prohibiting unions from attempting to organize their employees or inducing them to 
join in strikes. With this development, yellow dog contracts became valuable to anti-union 
employers.”180 After Hitchman, employers’ movement toward wider adoption of anti-union 
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contracts accelerated.181 One example is the 1927 Fourth Circuit case, International Organization, 
United Mine Workers of America v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal & Coke Co.182 In Red Jacket, the 
Fourth Circuit enjoined the United Mine Workers of America from “inciting, inducing, or 
persuading the employees of the plaintiff to break their contract of employment with the 
plaintiffs,”183 and from helping former employees stay in the homes that their employers provided 
them in a company town.184 William Forbath says “In Hitchman’s wake, scores of yellow-dog 
injunctions against the UMW blanketed West Virginia’s coal counties, and blocked all attempts to 
organize the state’s miners.”185 “One could not work in a West Virginia mine or in the non-union 
mines of southwestern Pennsylvania without signing such a contract.”186 More broadly in the 
1920s, Forbath writes that “courts issued over 2100 anti-strike decrees and the proportion of strikes 
met by injunctions to the total number of strikes reached an extraordinary 25%.”187 Witte’s 1930 
article, Yellow Dog Contracts, referred to “their present widespread use.”188 
D.  Classical Liberalism Impeded Unionization 
 
 Section II of this Article has, in its previous subsections, explained how unionization 
attempts in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were largely impeded by employers’ strengths 
under three areas of law: (1) master-servant law’s evolution into the tort of malicious interference 
with contract; (2) the application of the Sherman Act to labor cartels; and (3) the enforcement of 
anti-union contracts. Other areas of law played a role as well. Perhaps most notably, constitutional 
 
 
181 Seidman, supra note 169, at  351 (“The appearance of the [Hitchman] decision was the signal for the introduction 
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law during this “Lochner Era”189 impeded unionization. As noted above of the 1921 Truax v. 
Corrigan decision,190 “[f]ollowing Lochner, the Court invalidated . . . laws that prohibited 
employers from forbidding their employees to join labor unions. These rulings likely inhibited the 
growth of labor unions.”191 The Court had earlier somewhat stepped back from Lochner, so “[b]y 
1917, Lochner seemed to be dead and buried.”192 However, Lochner “underwent a surprising 
renaissance in the 1920s when the more aggressively Lochnerian wing of the [Supreme] Court, 
bolstered by four appointments by President Warren Harding, took firm control. With a strong 
Lochnerian majority in place, led by Chief Justice (and former president) William Howard Taft, 
the Court . . . reviewed economic regulation much more aggressively than it had in the past.”193 
For instance, in the above-discussed case arising out of Kansas,194 “Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. 
Court of Industrial Relations, the Court unanimously held that states could not require industrial 
disputes to be settled by government-imposed mandatory arbitration.”195 In this era, as David 
Bernstein writes, most Supreme Court justices: 
 
in common with much of public opinion, saw labor unions as monopolistic 
organizations that threatened the freedom of both individual workers and their 
employers, just as monopolistic corporations threatened small businesses and 
consumers. The Justices also argued that upholding liberty of contract was crucial 
for the long-term prosperity of workers, because their ability to sell their labor in a 
free marketplace was their primary asset. In Coppage v. Kansas, [decided in 
1915,196] for example, the Court invalidated a law that prohibited employers from 
firing workers who joined unions. Justice Pitney wrote for the Court: 
 
The right [to liberty of contract] is as essential to the laborer as 
to the capitalist, to the poor as to the rich; for the vast majority of 
persons have no other honest way to begin to acquire property, save 
by working for money. 
 
 
189 See, e.g., Robin West, Toward the Study of the Legislated Constitution, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1343, 1348 (2011) 
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Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908)). 
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196 Coppage, 236 U.S. at 35 (striking down a law that prohibited “yellow dog” contracts, in which employees agreed 







An interference with this liberty so serious as that now under 
consideration, and so disturbing of equality of right, must be deemed 
to be arbitrary, unless it be supportable as a reasonable exercise of 
the police power of the State. 
 
In the Court’s view, merely helping labor unions did not satisfy the police power 
because, as noted above, unions were seen as potentially self-serving monopolistic 
organizations.197 
 
 As this passage from Coppage exemplifies, much of the law discussed in the previous 
pages broadly flowed from the widespread emphasis in the late 19th and, at least among many 
judges, early 20th centuries on a classical liberal “freedom of contract” conception of the right to 
sell one’s labor. Self-ownership of one’s body and labor had been core tenets of liberalism since 
foundational liberals like John Locke and Adam Smith. Locke wrote that “everyman has a property 
in his own Person. This no body has any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work 
of his hands, we may say, are properly his.”198 Adam Smith said “[t]he property which everyman 
has in his own labor, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred 
and inviolable.”199 This classical liberal emphasis on owning one’s labor and trading it for “other 
property” was in the 19th century often  called “free labor” and contrasted with slavery. This 
classical liberal “free labor” philosophy contributed greatly to important Republican policies—
from the abolition of slavery to free-market (laissez-faire) economics—that shaped many late 19th 
and early 20th century judges. As William Forbath, summarizing historian Eric Foner, writes: “the 
abolitionist, talked about the freedom of the Northern worker in terms of self-ownership, that is, 
simply not being a slave, being free to sell his own labor.”200 Forbath continues: 
 
The middle class abolitionists’ characteristic attitude toward labor, Foner 
writes, was exemplified in a pamphlet published by the New York abolitionist 
William Jay. In the course of a discussion of the benefits of immediate 
emancipation, Jay sought to answer the recurrent question, what would happen to 
the slave when free: 
 
He is free, and his own master, and can ask for no more. He 
is, in fact, for a time, absolutely dependent on his late owner. He can 
look to no other person for food to eat, clothes to put on, or house to 
shelter him . . . He is required to work, but labor is no longer the 
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badge of his servitude and the consummation of his misery, for it is 
voluntary. For the first time in his life he is party to a contract . . . In 
the course of time, the value of negro labor, like all other vendible 
commodities, will be regulated by the supply and demand. 
 
What is noteworthy in this argument, as Foner points out, is, first, the 
abolitionist’s ready acceptance of the condition which prompted (and would 
increasingly cause) so much complaint among the labor movement—the treatment 
of human labor as a ‘vendible commodity;’ and, second, the rather dubious use of 
the word ‘voluntary’ to describe the labor of an individual who owns nothing and 
is ‘absolutely dependent’ on his employer. ‘To the labor movement, Jay’s 
description of emancipation would qualify as a classic instance of ‘wage slavery:’ 
to Jay, it was an economic definition of freedom.’ And it was the abolitionists’ 
definition of freedom that would be enshrined by Gilded Age judges, some of them 
youthful colleagues of Jay’s in the antislavery movement.201 
 
In short, labor unions in the late 19th and early 20th centuries faced a tough audience in the many 
judges long immersed in classical liberalism’s emphasis on self-ownership and contractual 
freedom regarding the sale of labor.202  
 
 In contrast to these traditional judges, however, times were changing in the broader society. 
The late 1800s and early 1900s were a time of turbulent growth and rising inequalities in the United 
States.203 
 
In 1890, 11 million of the nation’s 12 million families earned less than $1200 per 
year; of this group, the average annual income was $380, well below the poverty 
line. Rural Americans and new immigrants crowded into urban areas. Tenements 
spread across city landscapes, teeming with crime and filth. Americans had sewing 
machines, phonographs, skyscrapers, and even electric lights, yet most people 
labored in the shadow of poverty. 
 . . . 
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Violent strikes and riots wracked the nation.204 
 
These violent strikes and riots embodied the turbulence of the era, as David Bernstein writes: 
 
Coincident with industrialization, nationalization, urbanization, and immigration 
were the 1880s rise of labor unions (craft and mass) and the 1890s consolidation of 
industry into pools and trusts. The concentration of labor and capital intensified the 
recurrent and sometimes violent labor conflict, for which names like Haymarket, 
Homestead, and Pullman still serve as synecdoches.205 
 
Violent conflicts between labor and capital intersected with conflicts among racial and ethnic 
groups. For instance, many unions excluded Black workers from membership and when union 
members went out on strike, employers often hired African-Americans as replacement workers, 
whom the strikers derided as “scabs.”206 Black workers formed an “Anti-Strikers Railroad Union” 
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Steel Corp. v. United Steel Workers of Am., No. C-1-00-374, 2002 WL 1624290 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2002). 
 
On November 20, 1999, the USWA [United Steelworkers], Local 169, and representatives of the 
AFL-CIO and other unions rallied against AK Steel, which had since taken over the Mansfield Plant. 
At the rally, representatives from numerous AFL-CIO affiliates donated money to Local 169. 
Speakers at the rally, including representatives of the AFL-CIO and USWA, derided AK Steel and 
its replacement workers, calling them “black booted goons,” “scabs,” “corporate greedy pigs,” and 
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to help break the 1894 Pullman strike,207 led by future Socialist Party presidential candidate 
Eugene Debs,208 which “left forty people dead, and Chicago . . . resembling a war zone.”209 
 
 These turbulent decades coincided with broad ideological changes. The vast inequalities of 
the Gilded Age provoked late 1800s populism,210 and then the Progressive Era of the early 1900s. 
Progressives advanced the increasingly popular view that industrialization warranted a transition 
from classical liberalism’s free markets (“laissez-faire”) toward more governmental effort to shift 
power from big businesses and the rich to the broader population.211 This broad ideological and 
legal transition from Gilded Age classical liberalism toward progressive regulation and 
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labor legislation of that decade largely removed obstacles to unionization and in fact encouraged 
the labor cartelization that empowered unions to reach agreements replacing employment at will 
with arbitration of employee grievances. Those changes are discussed in the following section. 
III. A NEW DEAL FOR LABOR UNIONS: LESS CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT, MORE CARTELIZATION 
A. The Great Depression 
 
 The Great Depression began in 1929. “Unemployment went from 3.2% in 1929 to 25.2% 
in 1933 and stayed above 10% until 1941.”213  
 
Bread lines, soup kitchens and rising numbers of homeless people became more 
and more common in America’s towns and cities. Farmers couldn’t afford to 
harvest their crops, and were forced to leave them rotting in the fields while people 
elsewhere starved. In 1930, severe droughts in the Southern Plains brought high 
winds and dust from Texas to Nebraska, killing people, livestock and crops. The 
“Dust Bowl” inspired a mass migration of people from farmland to cities in search 
of work.214 
 
“Home foreclosures more than tripled from pre-Depression levels to 1932, and by 1933 one 
thousand homes per day were subject to foreclosure. Home lending evaporated and . . . this was 






Gilded Age and Progressive Era reformers . . .  crafted a new language of social and economic rights 
. . . in response to provocations from the nation’s courts, whose interpretation of the Constitution 
meant enjoining strikes and union organizing, imprisoning trade unionists, and nullifying labor and 
social insurance legislation in the name of property rights and freedom of contract. . . .  
 
Labor law reformers and trade unionists contested the laissez-faire conception of constitutional 
freedom of contract and argued that real freedom of contract would be achieved through labor law 
reform, which would overcome grave inequalities of bargaining power . . ., although this 
achievement had to await the New Deal and World War II, which finally ushered the reformers’ 
narratives and political economy into the corridors of federal power. 
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The Great Depression combined with the decline of classical liberalism to expand popular 
and electoral support for shifting power from big businesses and the rich to the broader population, 
especially in labor matters. Accordingly, one might think of conservative 1920s federal judges as 
the last aging stones in the dam of classical liberalism holding back the massive waters of populist 
redistribution, until the torrential rains of the Great Depression finally generated enough force to 
break the dam. Or as Jeffrey Hirsch puts it, “[a]t times, social changes are so great that they are 
unable to fit tolerably within the current legal regime. When that happens, a threshold is breached, 
much like the widespread labor unrest and violence that, in combination with judicial hostility to 
workers’ rights, ultimately spurred the creation of federal labor law.”216  
B. Replacing Anti-Union Contracts with Legally-Encouraged Labor Cartelization 
 
Major legal obstacles to unionization largely fell in the 1930s. For instance, anti-union 
contracts were prohibited by the 1932 Norris-LaGuardia Act.217 It states that: 
 
Any undertaking or promise, such as is described in this section, . . . is declared to 
be contrary to the public policy of the United States, shall not be enforceable in any 
court of the United States and shall not afford any basis for the granting of legal or 
equitable relief by any such court, including specifically the following: 
 
Every undertaking or promise . . . constituting or contained in any contract or 
agreement of hiring or employment . . . whereby 
 
(a) Either party to such contract or agreement undertakes or promises not to join, 
become, or remain a member of any labor organization or of any employer 
organization; or 
 
(b) Either party to such contract or agreement undertakes or promises that he will 
withdraw from an employment relation in the event that he joins, becomes, or 
remains a member of any labor organization or of any employer organization.218 
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The Norris-LaGuardia Act was “constructed to greatly curtail the use of injunctions against union 
organizing and collective bargaining,”219 and says “[n]o court of the United States shall have 
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case 
involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or 
interested in such dispute.”220 Showing the extent to which the 1929 start of the Great Depression 
combined with the longer-term transition toward progressivism to shift many people’s views, the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act was sponsored by Republicans and passed a Congress that would not until 
the following year switch to both houses controlled by Democrats. 
 
 Democrats won the 1932 election in a landslide “with a mandate to combat the Great 
Depression.”221 The Democratic candidate for president, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, defeated 
incumbent Republican Herbert Hoover by an electoral college margin of 472 to 59. From 1933 
through 1946, Democrats controlled the presidency and both houses of Congress. 
 
As discussed above, the Clayton Act of 1914 had moved toward exempting labor cartels 
(unions) from the federal antitrust laws, but was narrowly interpreted by the Supreme Court, so 
“boycotts and, in many circumstances, strikes and picketing, remained subject to antitrust 
liability.”222 In contrast, New Deal legislation not only exempted labor cartels from the antitrust 
laws, but actively encouraged the formation of labor cartels. This was originally attempted by the 
1933 National Industry Recovery Act, struck down by the Supreme Court,223 but was then 
accomplished by the Wagner Act of 1935.224 The “Wagner Act was ineffective until 1937, its 
functionality hamstrung by employers’ near universal contempt for its mandates and the courts’ 
similarly widespread view that it could not possibly survive constitutional review either.”225 
However, the Supreme Court upheld the Wagner Act in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., a 
landmark decision, “which at once upheld the Wagner Act and legitimated the New Deal itself.”226 
The Jones & Laughlin Steel decision occurred shortly after the “switch in time that saved nine,” 
when two conservative justices switched their votes and “abandoned original understanding of the 
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Constitution to permit what would otherwise have been unconstitutional--the New Deal.”227 The 
“Lochner Era” in constitutional law was definitely over by 1937.228   
 
Section 1 of the Wagner Act, also known as the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),229 
begins “[t]he denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by 
some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of 
industrial strife.”230 Section 1 then refers to “[t]he inequality of bargaining power between 
employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract and 
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In 1935 and 1936, the Court struck down several key pieces of New Deal legislation. President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt thought “a recalcitrant Court was preventing the country from achieving 
necessary recovery and reform,” and he “chastise[d] the Justices for their ‘horse and buggy 
interpretation’ of the Commerce Clause.” After his landslide 1936 reelection, Roosevelt announced 
in February 1937 his plan to enlarge the Court’s membership from nine to fifteen, which would have 
allowed him to appoint enough justices to reverse the Court’s recent decisions, and thus uphold the 
New Deal. “[T]he 1936 elections had given the Democrats dominant supermajorities in both the 
House and the Senate,” which gave Roosevelt “good reason to hope” that his “court-packing” bill 
would be approved. “In April, however, before the bill came to a vote in Congress, two Supreme 
Court justices came over to the liberal side and by a narrow majority upheld as constitutional the 
National Labor Relations Act and the Social Security Act.” 
 
This “switch in time that saved nine” “provided the basis for a profound shift from federalism to 
nationalism [that has] effectively given Congress a police power . . . to regulate any matter under 
the guise of the original Commerce Clause.” As Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn explain: 
 
The Court’s switch in time averted a constitutional showdown between the Court 
and the political system, and between 1937 and 1943 Roosevelt remade the Court 
with nine nominees. The immediate agenda of the New Deal Court was to 
interpret the Commerce Clause broadly enough to embrace regulatory legislation 
with incidental (but demonstrable) effects on interstate commerce, and with this 
the coalition consolidated the new Commerce Clause jurisprudence with 
unanimous majorities by 1942. 
 
Id. at 328-30. 
 
228 See, e.g., Joseph F. Morrissey, Lochner, Lawrence, and Liberty, 27 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 609, 640–41 (2011) (“In 
1937, the Supreme Court decided West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish. . . . West Coast Hotel overruled another Supreme 
Court opinion from just fifteen years earlier, Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, which followed Lochner. . . . Shortly after 
the West Coast Hotel case was decided, the Supreme Court put the final nail in the Lochner coffin with the Carolene 
Products case”); David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental 
Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 50–51 (2003) (“the 1920s and the Taft Court represented the last gasp of 
classical liberal principles in American public life for decades to come”). 
 
229 See supra note 8.   
 





Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize 
and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury . . . by encouraging 
practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes . . . and by 
restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and employees.231  
 
Accordingly, Section 1 of the NLRA declared “the policy of the United States to” be “encouraging 
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.”232 The NLRA created the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) to enforce employee rights.233  
 
The “centerpiece”234 of the NLRA is Section 7, which says “Employees shall have the right 
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose 
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”235 Section 8 says “[i]t shall be an unfair 
labor practice for an employer” to, among other things, “interfere with” employees’ section 7 rights 
or “to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of employees.”236 The NLRA was a 
“great assault on the concept of at-will employment, since a worker could no longer be fired for 
reasons protected by Section 7 of the Act.”237  
 
In short, the Norris-LaGuardia and Wagner Acts largely overrode the legal impediments to 
unionization discussed in Section II. The Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited anti-union contracts 
and greatly reduced the labor injunctions that had been based in tort or antitrust law. The Wagner 
Act (NLRA) encouraged the formation of labor unions and pressured employers to buy labor from 







233 49 Stat. 449, § 3 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 153) (expressing intent and establishing the NLRB). National Labor 
Relations Board, 1935 passage of the Wagner Act, https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/who-we-are/our-history/1935-
passage-of-the-wagner-act (last visited Dec. 1, 2020) (“The Wagner Bill proposed to create a new independent 
agency—the National Labor Relations Board, made up of three members appointed by the President and confirmed 
by the Senate-to enforce employee rights.”). 
 
234 SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MATTHEW BODIE, LABOR LAW 35 (2d ed. 2020). 
 
235 29 U.S.C  § 158. 
 
236 Id. The NLRA established the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to enforce these provisions and “to hold 
elections pursuant to [NLRA section] 9 to determine whether the majority of workers in an appropriate unit wished to 
be represented by a labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining.” ESTREICHER & BODIE, supra note 234, 
at 36. 
 






from other workers, some of whom might be willing to work for a lower wage.238 In other words, 
the NLRA facilitates workers organizing into a collective (cartel) to bargain as one unit against the 
employer, rather than leaving individual workers to compete with each other for jobs. The NLRA, 
as Richard Posner writes, “is a kind of reverse Sherman Act, designed to encourage cartelization 
of labor markets.”239 
 
Michael Wachter similarly explains that “the economic model of the NLRA was 
cartelization of the labor market.”240 “Unions would have monopoly power in the labor market,” 
so “wages would be set by the dictates of the collective bargaining process and not the dictates of 
the marketplace.”241 The NLRA aimed to raise wages and reduce “industrial strife” by permitting 
sellers of labor (workers) to form a cartel and by pressuring buyers of such labor (employers) to 
buy labor from workers represented by the cartel, rather than from other sellers (workers) who 
might accept a price (wage) lower than the cartel’s price. 
 
The original NLRA (Wagner Act) was modified in 1947 by the Taft Hartley Act to prohibit 
the “closed shop,” so employers are no longer literally required to buy labor only from union 
members.242 But prohibiting the closed shop did not typically free employers from negotiating 
with a cartel or leave individual workers competing with each other. That is because once a union 
wins an election to be the employees’ exclusive bargaining representative, the union represents all 
relevant workers (including both union members and non-members) in collective bargaining, so 
all relevant workers are governed by the same CBA, and thus all of them are paid the same union 
wage.  
 
Employers are generally prohibited from paying lower wages or providing lesser benefits 
to non-union-members doing similar work (and with the same seniority) as union-member 
 
 
238 The employer pays wages and benefits to employees, but at a price set by the CBA between the employer and 
union.   
 
239 POSNER, supra note 115, § 12.2. 
 
240 Wachter, supra note 216, at 442 (“the economic model of the NLRA was to cartelize the labor market”).  
 
241 Id. at 428. 
 
242 ESTREICHER & BODIE, supra note 234, at 38 (“Taft-Hartley outlawed the ‘closed shop’ (where union membership 
is a prerequisite for employment), and permitted states to enact so-called ‘right to work’ laws outlawing even the 
‘union shop’ (where union membership or its financial equivalent is required only after an initial period of 
employment)”); Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 169, 174-81 (2015) 
(describing the NLRA allowing membership of a union as a pre-requisite to employment, but that allowance being 
removed by the Taft-Hartley Act); Denise Oas & Steven Lance Popejoy, The Right-to-Work Battle Rages on at Both 
the Federal and State Levels, 29 MIDWEST L.J. 71, 75-76 (2019) (“Historically, the closed shop (defined as a union 
security agreement which required union membership as a condition of employment) had been used by the NLRA 
during World War II . . . Following the war, the government exercised greater control over labor unions, and with the 





employees because both types of employees are likely to be in the same “bargaining unit,”243 for 
which the union has won an NLRB-supervised election to be the “exclusive bargaining 
representative” for employees in that unit.244 Exclusive representation by a union requires the 
employer and union to negotiate only one CBA, which must apply to and treat all employees within 
 
 
243 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (“Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the 
majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the 
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, 
or other conditions of employment”); Richard R. Carlson, The Origin and Future of Exclusive Representation in 
American Labor Law, 30 DUQ. L. REV. 779, 837 (1992) (an exclusive representative’s “role is that of a bargaining 
agent, and its power derives primarily from the employer’s duty to bargain with the union and “to treat with no other.”); 
29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1935) (“The [N.L.R.B.] shall decide in each case whether , . . the unit appropriate for the purposes 
of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof”). See also N.L.R.B. 
v. Action Auto., Inc., 469 U.S. 490, 494 (1985) (“The Board’s discretion in this area is broad, reflecting Congress’ 
recognition of the need for flexibility in shaping the [bargaining] unit to the particular case. The Board does not 
exercise this authority aimlessly; in defining bargaining units, its focus is on whether the employees share a community 
of interest.”)(internal quotations omitted); Kindred Nursing Centers E., LLC v. N.L.R.B., 727 F.3d 552, 560 (6th Cir. 
2013) (“The [community of interest] test includes the following five factors: (1) similarity in skills, interests, duties 
and working conditions; (2) functional integration of the plant, including interchange and contact among the 
employees; (3) the employer’s organization and supervisory structure; (4) the bargaining history; and (5) the extent of 
union organization among the employees.”). 
 
244 ESTREICHER & BODIE, supra note 234, at 47 (the NLRA is “based on the principle of exclusive representation (only 
the representatives chosen by a majority of the employees in a unit may bargain with the employer over terms and 
conditions of employment, to the exclusion of individual employees or a members-only group); and a legally mandated 
duty to bargain (both the exclusive representative and the employer are legally obligated to bargain in ‘good faith’”); 
POSNER, supra note 115, § 12.2. 
 
If an organizing campaign succeeds to the extent that at least 30 percent of the workers sign cards 
authorizing the union to be their collective bargaining representative, the National Labor Relations 
Board will conduct an election for collective bargaining representative. If the union wins a majority 
of the votes cast, it will become the workers’ exclusive bargaining representative. The employer 
will then be required to bargain with the union in good faith over the terms of an employment 
contract for all the workers in the collective bargaining unit; he will not be allowed to bargain 
separately with individual workers. 
 
The representation election, the principle of exclusive representation, and the union shop together 
constitute an ingenious set of devices . . . for overcoming the free-rider problems that would 
otherwise plague the union as a large-numbers cartel. . . . 
 
The design of the electoral unit in representation election—the bargaining unit as it is called—is 
critical. The Labor Board will certify any group of employees that is at once homogeneous with 
regard to conditions of employment (wages, fringe benefits, work duties, etc.) and distinct from 
other employees of the firm. A single plant or facility may contain several different bargaining units 
each of which will negotiate separately with the employer. Consistent with the law’s policy of 
facilitating worker cartels, the Board generally certifies the smallest rather than the largest possible 
unit. Transaction costs among workers are lower the fewer the workers and the more harmonious 







the bargaining unit similarly, regardless of an employee’s union membership status.245 Only in 
exceptional cases or non-exclusive (“members only”) representative agreements,246 may 
employers negotiate individualized deals with some, but not all, employees in a bargaining unit. 
Otherwise, an employer paying a non-union worker less than the union wage in the CBA would 
commit an unfair labor practice in violation of the NLRA.247 So employers generally must pay 
union-represented employees the (higher) cartel price of labor whether or not a particular employee 
is technically a member of the union. In other words, the NLRA’s legally-encouraged cartelization 
of labor raising wages above their competitive level persists by effectively including in the cartel 
all workers—union member or not—the employer may hire for the relevant jobs.  
 
After the NLRA, labor “unions are legalized cartels attempting to monopolize labor 
markets in much the same manner that business firms attempt to monopolize a product market.”248 
Much as a sole monopolist business can profit by raising its price above that which sellers in a 
 
 
245 See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2467 (2018) (“Not only is 
the union given the exclusive right to speak for all the employees in collective bargaining, but the employer is required 
. . .  to listen to and to bargain in good faith with only that union.). 
 
246 ESTREICHER & BODIE, supra note 234, at 132.  
 
In most settings, before any union enters the scene, employees have preexisting relationships with 
their employers which are governed by employer rules subject to the state common law of contracts. 
In J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, the employer entered into written employment agreements with its 
employees and invoked those agreements as a bar to any collective bargaining with the exclusive 
representative selected by the employees. The Supreme Court held that the individual agreements 
provided no bar to the employer’s duty to bargain with the employees’ exclusive representative. 
“The very purpose of providing by statute for the collective agreement is to supersede the terms of 
separate agreements of employees with terms which reflect the strength and bargaining power and 
serve the welfare of the group.” Because unions can negotiate or allow different arrangements, as in 
the sports and entertainment industries, J.I. Case is best seen as establishing a presumption that can 
only be overcome by clear evidence of the union’s waiver of its right to insist on exclusive dealing. 
One reason for the rule is that individual contracts could dissipate the strength of the collective 
agent. As the Court noted, “advantages to individuals may prove as disruptive of industrial peace as 
disadvantages.” 
 
Compare Merck, Sharp & Dohme Corp., 367 NLRB No. 122 (May 7, 2019) (holding that vacation benefits given only 
to non-union workers was lawful under the NLRA because of the structure of the “members-only” union relationship).  
 
247 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer “to refuse to bargain collectively with 
the representatives of his employees”). See also Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions A Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 MICH. 
L. REV. 169, 178 (2015) (under the NLRA “once a majority of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit chooses 
to be represented by a union, the union becomes the exclusive representative of the whole bargaining unit, and the 
employer has a duty to bargain with the union over all employees’ wages and working conditions.”).  
 
248 HENRY N. BUTLER, ET AL., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 470 (3d ed. 2014); id. at 471 (“Unions increase 
wages above market wages by either (a) restricting entry of non-union workers into union controlled jobs and allowing 
the market to clear at a higher price or (b) negotiating higher wages with employers.”) Each tends to have the same 






competitive market would charge,249 a cartel’s members can similarly profit by uniformly raising 
their prices above that which sellers in a competitive market would charge. But higher prices tend 
to reduce the quantity of whatever goods or labor is sold because some buyers who would have 
been willing to pay the competitive market price are unwilling to pay the higher monopoly price.250 
So a cartel’s success typically depends on its members’ unity in limiting their total output (quantity 
sold) as well as maintaining price. Cartels often fail because some cartel members, or rival sellers 
from outside the cartel, attract buyers by selling at a price below the cartel price,251 which tends to 
require the remaining “loyal” members of the cartel to lower their prices too, if they are to continue 
finding willing buyers.   
 
Consequently, the “collective” part of “collective bargaining” is central to the cartelization 
of labor through which unions raise wages or benefits for their members. As the AFL-CIO puts it, 
“Collective bargaining is . . . the best means for raising wages”; “through collective bargaining, 
working people in unions have higher wages, better benefits and safer workplaces.”252 Or, in the 
words of a textbook on the economic analysis of law, “[t]he main purpose of a union . . . is to limit 
the supply of labor so that the employer cannot use competition among workers to control the price 
of labor (wages).”253 Suppressing competition from other workers (sellers of labor) is key to a 
union’s success because only if all sellers of (the relevant type of) labor collectively refuse to work 
for less than the “union wage,” must the employer must pay that wage to obtain that labor. But if 
this refusal—a strike—does not include all available sellers of such labor, then employers can hire 
workers outside the collective as replacements for the strikers, or employers can avoid paying the 
higher union wage by shifting production to lower wage, non-union shops.254  
 
 
249 See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text. 
 
250 BUTLER, ET AL., supra note 248, at 471 (“Unions increase wages above market wages by either (a) restricting entry 
of non-union workers into union controlled jobs and allowing the market to clear at a higher price or (b) negotiating 
higher wages with employers.”) Each tends to have the same effects of reducing the supply of labor and raising its 
price. Id. Figure VIII-11. 
 
251 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 115, at 364 (“The members or a cartel agree to keep prices up, which profits the 
members as a group. Each individual member, however, profits even more by undercutting the cartel’s price and luring 
buyers away from other members. To prevent such ‘cheating,’ the cartel must punish members who undercut the 
cartel’s price.”). 
 
252 Am. Fed’n of Labor & Cong. Of Indus. Orgs., What Unions Do: Collective Bargaining, https://aflcio.org/what-
unions-do/empower-workers/collective-bargaining  (last visited August 4, 2020). 
 
253 BUTLER, ET AL., supra note 248, at 427. 
 
254 Keith J. Gross, Separate to Unite: Will Change to Win Strengthen Organized Labor in America?, 24 BUFF. PUB. 
INT. L.J. 75, 79–81 (2006). 
 
For example, in 1919 the AFL-affiliate Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers 
of America (“AA”) organized a steel strike of over 350,000 workers in hopes of convincing U.S. 








For instance, a critic of the Supreme Court’s 1917 Hitchman case enforcing anti-union  
contracts, Harvard Law Professor Francis Bowes Sayre, discussed the coal industry at the time: 
 
Practically all coal mines in what was known as the Panhandle District of West 
Virginia were run upon this non-union basis, while the entire industry in Ohio, 
Indiana, and Illinois, known as the “Central Competitive Field,” were operated 
under union conditions, all the employees being members of the United Mine 
Workers of America. The coal of each district came into direct competition with 
that of the other; and as long as coal could be produced in the unorganized 
Panhandle District at rockbottom wages and consequent low production costs, it 
not only became increasingly more difficult for the operators in the Central 
Competitive Field to maintain prices high enough to grant certain concessions 
demanded by the union, but it also enabled mine owners to break strikes called in 
the Central Competitive Field by supplying coal mined in the nonunion Panhandle 
District. In other words, if collective bargaining was to continue to function freely 
in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, it would be necessary to remove the competition of 
the unorganized Panhandle mines. The fact that the industry functioned upon a 
national scale required the unions similarly to operate upon a nation-wide scale. 
Accordingly, at the international convention of the United Mine Workers of 
America, held at Indianapolis in 1907, it was decided as a measure “absolutely 
necessary to protect us against the competition that comes from the unorganized 




AA’s demands, and simply responded by bringing in strikebreakers--both white and black--and 
suppressing the strikers with private guards and police. . . . At the same time, . . . unions . . . like the 
International Ladies Garment Workers’ Union (“ILGWU”), were “torn asunder by competition from 
non-union shops” . . . .  
 
As the 1919-20 steel strike demonstrates, employers in industries with semi-skilled or unskilled 





255 Sayre, supra note 94, at 674. See also Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 240–41 (1917) (“The 
unorganized condition of the mines in the Panhandle and some other districts was recognized as a serious interference 
with the purposes of the union in the Central Competitive Field, particularly as it tended to keep the cost of production 
low, and, through competition with coal produced in the organized field, rendered it more difficult for the operators 





This passage, by an advocate of unionization,256 is just one example of the standard economics 
that success by cartels in raising the price their members can charge requires suppressing 
competition from other sellers.257  
  
For these reasons, Michael Wachter explains, the Wagner Act, “could only take wages out 
of competition if the entire industry, including all new entrants, were unionized and wages were 
bargained at the industry level. . . . But from the outset, staying non-union under the Wagner Act 
gave firms much lower labor costs, which provided a great inducement to stay non-union.”258 
Wachter adds that “higher union wages” could only under the NLRA “be paid for out of corporate 
profits since the employers could be forestalled from increasing prices by product market 
competition from non-union producers or those with weaker unions.”259 In other words, investors 
 
 
256 Sayre, supra note 94, at 694–695. 
 
Were it not for trade unions, wages through the drive of relentless competition must be driven 
inevitably below the minimum cost of subsistence, and working conditions be forced to a point 
beyond average human endurance; the inescapable harvest could only be poorhouse relief, charitable 
doles, reduced vitality, increased sickness, an increased death rate, overcrowding, crime, and the 
long train of social ills which dance attendance upon a society which pays the worker less than it 
costs him and his family to live. 
 
Furthermore, in its present form industry can not be stabilized except through organization methods, 
such as trade agreements, arbitration boards and similar devices, made possible through trade 
unionism. There is a very real social interest, then, in the existence of trade unions; and these can 
not continue to exist and function unless they are free to add to their membership by persuading 
through lawful means non-union men to join their ranks and by “organizing” non-union fields. 
When, therefore, in the Hitchman case, one comes to reckon up the interests concerned, one finds 
weighing against the plaintiff a social interest of prime importance in the free existence and 
legitimate functioning of trade unions. 
 
Id. at 674. 
 
257 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 115, § 10.1 (9th ed. 2014) (“any part of the market that is outside of the colluding 
circle limits the power of the colluding sellers to raise the market price.”) See generally COOTER & ULEN, supra note 
115, at 364 (“The members or a cartel agree to keep prices up, which profits the members as a group. Each individual 
member, however, profits even more by undercutting the cartel’s price and luring buyers away from other members. 
To prevent such ‘cheating,’ the cartel must punish members who undercut the cartel’s price.”). 
 
258 Wachter, supra note 216, at 441. See also Cynthia L. Estlund, Economic Rationality and Union Avoidance: 
Misunderstanding the National Labor Relations Act., 71 TEX. L. REV. 921, 924 (1993) (“Unions typically seek to 
increase labor’s share of a firm’s revenues; the firm that is successfully unionized, and as a result pays 
higher wages and benefits, must continue to compete against non-union firms that generally pay lower wages. It may 
therefore be reasonable for firms to regard union activism itself, by its very nature, as economically threatening to the 
firm. Yet union activity is protected by federal law against employer discrimination and interference.”). 
 
259 Wachter, supra note 216, at 441. In contrast, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933, which was 
held unconstitutional in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), authorized the creation 
of industry cartels to reduce competition. See Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a 






seeking high rates of return (generated by corporate profits) could be expected to move capital, 
and thus job opportunities, from unionized firms with high labor costs to non-unionized firms with 
lower labor costs, including firms operating outside the U.S.260 This opposition of interests 
between workers and owners, Wachter points out, made “[t]he cooperative spirit envisioned by 
Senator Wagner”—in which employers “[c]ompelled to live with unions . . . would learn to 
cooperate with them”—“an impossible dream from the beginning.”261  
C. Legally-Encouraged Labor Cartelization Replaced At-Will Employment with 
Labor Grievance Arbitration 
 
The previous sections of this Article explained that employers understandably resist 
unionization because it raises labor costs, and that such resistance in the U.S. was generally 
successful in the 19th and early 20th centuries in staving off unionization, and thus the collective 
bargaining agreements that have since replaced at-will employment with arbitration of labor 
grievances. “Nineteenth century employers,” Nolan and Abrams emphasize, “recognized unions 
only under great pressure, and accepted arbitration even less willingly. No more than a handful of 
arbitration cases on wages and hours could have occurred before 1900.”262 Witte concurs that the 
“great weakness of” late 19th century labor arbitration laws “was that the employers generally 
refused arbitration.”263 Similarly in the first three decades of the 20th century, most employers—
often with courts’ help—continued successfully to resist unionization, even amidst ongoing 
violence and Progressive Era legislation. So, even through the 1920s most employers refused to 
submit workplace disputes to arbitration. Pre-1930s employers could refuse to arbitrate workplace 
disputes because employers usually had the legal power (under the laws discussed in Section II) 
to resolve disputes through other means, including simply firing employees asserting grievances. 
 
 
260 Andrias, supra note 4, at 26–27 (an “employer may avoid unionization by closing its operations, by subcontracting, 
by ‘doublebreasting’ through a nonunion company, or by moving production.”) Due to these factors and others, like 
competition from workers overseas, unions have declined in the private sector since the 1950s and now only represent 
about 7% of private-sector workers. “Following the upsurge in organizing during New Deal, union density--the 
percentage of workers in unions--rose to a peak of 35% in the mid-1950s. Density remained largely stable through the 
postwar period, until the 1970s and 1980s saw the labor movement’s precipitous decline.” Charles Du, Securing Public 
Interest Law’s Commitment to Left Politics, 128 Yale L.J. Forum 244, 249–50 (2018). “[B]y 2017, just 10.7% of all 
workers in the United States belonged to a union, including only 6.5% of private-sector workers.” Id. 
 
261 Wachter, supra note 216, at 440–41. 
 
262 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 32, at 380. 
 
263 WITTE, supra note 28, at 10. “Some demand was expressed in labor circles for legislation to compel employers to 
arbitrate. . . . But Samuel Gompers came out strongly against compulsory arbitration . . .  [and] [h]is position was 
officially adopted by the American Federation of Labor . . . , [which] declared itself in favor of agreements with 
employers on conditions of employment and also of voluntary arbitration, but totally in opposition to compulsory 






So long as employers could fire and replace employees asserting grievances, employers had little 
incentive to submit employee grievances to binding arbitration.264  
 
By contrast, the early 20th century ideological shift from classical liberalism to 
progressivism combined with the Great Depression to produce massive legal changes in the 1930s. 
The Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited anti-union contracts and greatly reduced the labor 
injunctions that had been based in tort or antitrust law. The Wagner Act (NLRA) went further in 
encouraging the formation of labor cartels (unions) and then pressuring employers to buy labor 
from workers represented by the cartel, thus encouraging unions to do what cartels do—raise 
prices—in this case the prices of labor. Unions raise wages or benefits for their members through 
collective (cartel) bargaining rather than leaving individual workers to compete against each other 
for jobs, wages, and benefits.  
 
The agreements arising out of collective bargaining typically implement the major change 
of replacing employers’ freedom to fire workers at will with the constraint that employers can fire 
a worker only “for cause.”265 Why did employers—after decades of successfully resisting this huge 
limitation on their freedom—accept it in collective bargaining agreements (CBAs)? Mostly 
because the NLRA and other progressive legislation had greatly restricted employers’ freedom to 
buy labor from workers not represented by the government-encouraged cartel (union) that had won 
an NLRB-supervised election to be the “exclusive bargaining representative” for workers doing 
the relevant jobs.266 As the Supreme Court said in United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & 
Gulf Navigation Co., “[w]hen most parties enter into [a] contractual relationship they do so 
voluntarily, in the sense that there is no real compulsion to deal with one another, as opposed to 
dealing with other parties. This is not true of the labor agreement.”267 Employers are legally-
compelled to contract with the union rather than other workers offering similar types of labor, and 
 
 
264 WITTE, supra note 28, at 45–46. “Nearly always,” Witte observes, “recognition of and dealing with the union 
precedes arbitration.” “Arbitration concerning the interpretation and application of contract provisions—by far the 
most frequent type of arbitration in recent decades— can occur only when there is an agreement to interpret.” 
 
265 POSNER, supra note 115, § 12.5 (9th ed. 2014) (“employment at will is the normal form of labor contract in the 
United States. The worker can quit when he wants; the employer can fire the employee when the employer wants.”); 
id. § 12.4 (“Collective bargaining contracts generally establish a grievance machinery for arbitrating workers’ 
complaints and also give workers job security—not absolute security, for they can be laid off if the firm’s demand for 
labor declines, but security against being fired other than for good cause (determined by means of the grievance 
machinery).”) See also MARK ROTHSTEIN, ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1:29 (5th ed. 2014) (“Eventually, most 
collective bargaining agreements contained protection from discharge except for ‘just cause,’ with arbitration to 
resolve grievances.”); ELKOURI & ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 931–33 (Kenneth May ed., 8th ed.  
2016)(union contracts almost always require cause for dismissal, and typically provide an arbitration mechanism as a 
method of review of employer decisions.); Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic 
Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 MO. L. REV. 679 (1994) (surveying history of employment-at-
will rule and its exceptions). 
 
266 See supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text. 
 





it is this compulsion that gives unions the power to extract from employers agreements to replace 
at-will employment with arbitration of employee grievances. 
 
Once an employer accepts that it must buy its labor from workers exclusively represented 
by the union, the employer is typically willing to pay a high price for the union’s promise not to 
strike.268 So in exchange for that no-strike promise, unions are typically able to extract employers’ 
promises not to fire workers except “for cause” and to submit to an arbitrator’s decision on what 
counts as “cause” in a particular case.269 Unions are also often able to extract other CBA 
restrictions on employers’ freedom to discipline or re-assign duties of employees, and to submit 
grievances about those matters to arbitration, as well.270 This “grievance procedure” culminating 
in arbitration, “rather than a strike, is the terminal point of a disagreement,” between workers and 
their employer under the NLRA, Warrior & Gulf explained.271 In other words, legally-encouraged 




268 ESTREICHER & BODIE, supra note 234, at 157 (“The ability to withdraw the company’s labor force en masse is a 
union’s principal weapon. The NLRA itself provides specific protection for the strike.”); id. (“Under the NLRA, a 
union is legally entitled to go on strike with relatively little hindrance”). POSNER, supra note 115,  § 12.2 (9th ed. 
2014). 
 
[The NLRA] makes it hard for the employer to operate with replacement workers by forbidding him 
to pay them a higher wage than the striking workers whom they replace, by allowing the strikers to 
picket the plant, and by forbidding him to sever the employment relationship with the striking 
workers. He must therefore reinstate the strikers when the strike is over unless their jobs have been 
filled by permanent replacements, but in that event he must place the strikers at the head of the queue 
to fill vacancies as they occur. These three rules work together by allowing the strikers to identify 
the replacement workers, by reminding the latter that when the strike ends they may find themselves 
working side by side with the strikers—an uncomfortable, sometimes a dangerous, proximity that 
deters many people from hiring on as replacements—and by preventing the employer from paying 




269 WITTE, supra note 28, at 49. (1953) (“Grievance arbitration was extensively adopted as a corollary of the 
development of grievance procedures and of no-strike provisions in union contracts.”) CBAs commonly permit 
employers to fire, or otherwise discipline, an employee only “for cause.” ROTHSTEIN, ET AL, supra note 265, § 9:1 
(“Eventually, most collective bargaining agreements contained protection from discharge except for ‘just cause,’ with 
arbitration to resolve grievances.”); FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 15–4–15–
6 (7th ed. 2012 & Supp. 2014) (union contracts almost always require cause for dismissal, and typically provide an 
arbitration mechanism as a method of review of employer decisions.). 
 
270 WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 8, at 222 (unions may “arbitrate cases involving any alleged breach of a CBA 
provision. These cases might involve any number of issues such as an allegation that an employer has sub-contracted 
work in violation of a work-preservation provision, a dispute over whether a certain scheduling system is permissible, 
a request to accommodate a disabled employee, or allegations that pay or break provisions are not being properly 
followed.”). 
 





Through this process of legally-compelling employers to buy labor from a cartel, unions 
and labor grievance arbitration grew from the 1930s to the 1950s.272 As the previous paragraph 
suggested, a promise not to strike is typically a union’s main bargaining chip in negotiating a CBA 
because the right to strike—“to withdraw the company’s labor force en masse”—“is a union’s 
principal weapon.”273 So in the late 1930s the newly-created National Labor Relations Board 
worked to maximize the strength of that weapon (the strike) and thus the value of that bargaining 
chip (a promise not to strike). “Under the leadership of a group of leftist lawyers between 1935 
and 1939, the NLRB aggressively defended the right to strike. With an obvious sense that an 
effective right to strike was crucial to the entire regime of labor law, the agency’s staff went to 
considerable lengths to protect strikers from reprisals by employers and government officials.”274  
 
The year 1936, when the constitutionality of the NLRA and NLRB were still in doubt,275 
was a particularly intense year of industrial warfare, often in the form of the sit-down strike, in 
which workers occupied their employers’ buildings to stop production until employers recognized 
the union.276 Sit-down striker-trespassers sometimes successfully fought off attempts by police 
and private security forces to remove the trespassers and permit production to resume with 
replacement workers. Ahmed White describes the landmark sit-down strike of General Motors 
plants in Flint, Michigan, that began on December 30, 1936. 
 
[C]onsistent with the union’s overall plans but in a spontaneous way, 
workers seized Fisher Body Plants Nos. 1 and 2. The seizure was orderly. Strikers 
immediately ushered out foremen and managers and set about securing the 
sprawling facilities against attack and otherwise preparing for an occupation that 
would last an extraordinary forty-four days. During this time, the strikers 
successfully repelled a major assault by the police--an ignominious rout that 
unionists tauntingly dubbed the “Battle of the Running Bulls.” The strikers also 
defied two court injunctions ordering them to evacuate the plants, in part by 
bringing to light the issuing judges’ ownership of GM stock. . . . [S]hortages created 
by the strike bottlenecked production and crippled GM’s operations nationwide. 
 
 
272 Charles Du, Securing Public Interest Law’s Commitment to Left Politics, 128 YALE L.J. FORUM 244, 249–50 (2018) 
(“Following the upsurge in organizing during the New Deal, union density—the percentage of workers in unions--
rose to a peak of 35% in the mid-1950s.”). 
 
273 ESTREICHER & BODIE, supra note 234, at 157. 
 
274 White, supra note 82, at 1084. 
 
275 The NLRA “was widely disregarded until it was held to be constitutional in 1937.” Fleming, supra note 29, at 
1246. 
 
276 Ahmed A. White, Industrial Terrorism and the Unmaking of New Deal Labor Law, 11 NEV. L.J. 561, 582 (2011) 
(“In 1936 alone, however, there were forty-eight sit-down strikes of at least one day’s duration. Between 1936 and 
1939, there would be almost six hundred major sit-down strikes, most conducted by CIO unionists. In most cases, 
these strikes were used by workers to press organizational aims in the face of employers’ use of illegal means to resist 





Indeed, the strike spread to around a dozen other GM facilities, eventually idling 
about 150,000 production workers. 
 
As the strike wore on, GM gradually ran out of options. After the defeat of 
the local police, the company was unable either to cajole or threaten Michigan’s 
liberal governor, Frank Murphy, into using the National Guard to oust the strikers; 
it was also unable to convince President Roosevelt to back down the CIO 
leadership. In the meantime, the strike succeeded in negating GM’s erstwhile 
capacity for labor repression: its hundreds of police and spies were rendered 
useless, and its capacity for propaganda was, for the time at least, trumped by the 
workers’ sensational gambit. . . . [T]he company was forced into a preliminary 
agreement that provided for the company’s eventual recognition of the UAW as the 
exclusive agent of the company’s production workers. 
 
The political significance of the strike extended beyond GM. Needless to 
say, the strike had been thrilling, front-page news nationwide. Aside from the 
remarkable spectacle of impoverished workers defiantly holding the property of the 
world’s largest company, the UAW victory was by far the single most significant 
victory over an open shop employer in American history. Few would have expected 
the UAW ever to prevail, given GM’s vast resources and the strength of its 
opposition to unionism. Workers of all kinds drew inspiration from the strikers’ 
victory. Autoworkers, in particular, responded with a new confidence in industrial 
unions and in the sit-down strike as a means of achieving this. In the weeks 
immediately following the end of the Flint strike, the UAW pulled at least eighteen 
sit-down strikes at other GM facilities before the company and the union finally 
agreed to a company-wide contract in mid-March 1937.277 
 
This story exemplifies the labor movement’s subordination of the “law in the books” (what statutes 
and courts said) to the “law in action”278 imposed by striker-trespassers numerous enough to hold 
 
 
277 Id. at 583–84. 
 
278 On the distinction between the books and the action, see Roscoe Pound, The Law in the Books and the Law in 
Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910).  
 
In formalistic thinking, there is an assumption that the statement and application of a norm will 
produce changes in reality, and that “law in the books” corresponds to “law in action.” . . . The 
counterclaim is that law in action is different from law in the books and that legal writing has, at 
best, only an indirect connection to social change. The origin of this critique goes back to the 
sociological jurisprudence movement developed by Roscoe Pound, which criticized legal studies 
for their emphasis on legal rules and decision-making, while ignoring the social context and 
implications of those decisions. 
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an employer’s property against law-enforcement efforts to evict them,279 and popular enough to 
deter progressive Democrats in the White House and governor’s office from enforcing the law in 
the books against those striker-trespassers.280 
 
 
279 White, supra note 82, at 1118-19 (2018) (“Dean Dinwoodey, law professor and editor of U.S. Law Week, spoke 
for most legal scholars when he declared in the New York Times that ‘under well settled principles of property law, 
the employer has a legally protected right to the exclusive possession of his factory or plant, just as the householder 
has to the exclusive possession of his home.’ In this sense, Dinwoodey said, the strikers were really nothing but 
trespassers.”). The NLRA permits some conduct that would otherwise be trespass. See Deborah Jacobson, Union 
Trespass: Sears v. Carpenters and Labor Law Preemption, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 779, 783 (1979) (“The protections of 
[NLRA] section 7 are thus quite broad: they extend to organizational activities, to activities in support of other 
employees, and to the preservation of area standards. Moreover, these protections apply to some extent even when the 
activity constitutes a trespass: in such cases, a proper accommodation between the respective rights is to be made by 
the NLRB.”); James Gray Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 
518, 543 (2004) (discussing balancing the state common law property trespass rights and federal statutory rights). 
 
280 White, supra note 82, at 1097–98 (2018) (“The GM strike succeeded in part because neither the Roosevelt 
Administration nor state forces under the control of Michigan Governor Frank Murphy intervened forcefully to oust 
the strikers.”) See also Vivian M. Baulch and Patricia Zacharias, The historic 1936-37 Flint auto plant strikes, THE 
DETROIT NEWS, June 23, 1997. 
 
As the nation was emerging from the Great Depression, the striking workers enjoyed the sympathy 
of most of the people, including Michigan governor Frank Murphy and popular New Deal President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Roosevelt had promised in his inaugural speech to drive out the 
“economic royalists,” a pointed reference to the General Motors officials.” 
. . .  
The union called for supporters to gather at Cadillac Square in Detroit as a show of strength. The 
overflowing crowd of 150,000 supporters surprised even the union sympathizers and gave the union 
the self-confidence they needed to show its power and solidarity over its management “oppressors.” 
Other union workers joined in sympathy strikes, closing plants in other states. 
 
Among the plants closed by a sit-down strike was Fisher No. 2, also in Flint. The company 
responded by turning off the heat, and the cold winter caused the strikers there to compare 
themselves to George Washington and his men at Valley Forge. 
 
Then, on Jan. 11, 1937, the police tried to stop food delivery [to the strikers by their families]. A 
riot ensued. 
 
“The rioting at Flint resulted in injury to 16 strikers and spectators and 11 officers,” The Detroit 
News reported. . . . . “Most of the strikers were injured by buckshot fired from riot guns by the Flint 
police. The officers were injured principally by missiles thrown from the plant by the stay-in 
strikers.” 
 
“A pitched battle raged at the gates of the plant for 20 minutes, with 30 to 40 policemen opposing 
several hundred enraged strikers. The strikers pelted the officers with iron nuts, bolts and milk 
bottles and spurted thick streams of water on them from fire hoses. The police retaliated with tear 









Moreover, these striker-trespassers and their progressive Democratic allies may have 
intimidated the Supreme Court into expanding its interpretation of the U.S. Constitution’s 
Commerce Clause to permit what would otherwise have been unconstitutional—the Wagner Act 
and broader New Deal.281 Ahmed White argues that the Flint sit-down strike “played the key role 
in influencing the Supreme Court to follow through in upholding the constitutionality of Wagner 
Act (and thus the entire New Deal) later that spring, in the landmark Jones & Laughlin Steel 
decision.”282  
 
[T]he Supreme Court’s decision in the Jones & Laughlin case cannot be understood 
apart from the Justices’ apprehensions about where this remarkable upsurge of 
labor militancy might lead if the Wagner Act were not upheld, which looms as 
important in this regard as the President’s court-packing scheme and the magnitude 
of his and other New Deal candidates’ landslide victories in the 1936 election.283 
 
By the time the Supreme Court held the NLRA constitutional in 1937, “a strong drive to organize 
the mass-production industries was under way.”284 Helped “by the missionary enthusiasm of the 
many new unionists, but also by favorable court decisions and a friendly national administration, 
union membership grew apace.”285 “One by one the large corporations in the great mass-
production industries of steel, automobiles, rubber, and meat packing recognized unions 
representing a majority of their employees and concluded their first labor-management 
agreements. Almost equally great gains were made in many smaller establishments. Unions won 
contracts literally by the thousands.”286 
 
 
Twice the attacking police were repulsed. The winds had shifted and sent the tear gas back on the 
officers, who were then pelted with metal hinges thrown by the strikers. A crowd of sympathizers 
protected the strikers and the police retreated. 
 
“The battle ended with the strikers in complete control of the gates,” 
. . .  
[D]espite his mobilizing 4,000 National Guardsmen, [Gov.] Murphy refused to use them against the 
workers. The besieged sit-downers held. They continued to warm themselves with barrels of burning 
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As Melvyn Dubofsky writes, 1937 was “exceptional” because the labor “strikes were 
massive and nationwide as well as innovative in their tactics (this was the year par excellence for 
the sit-down strike).”287 Second, Dubofsky stresses that the 1937 “strike results produced a major 
transformation in the dominant pattern of labor-capital relations in [manufacturing, as] trade 
unionism had come to stay in that sector of the economy and capital began to bargain with labor’s 
representatives.288 Ahmed White agrees that 1937 “is probably the single most critical year in 
American labor history,” with “4740 strikes involving over seven percent of the working 
population.”289  
 
The late 1930s saw “a dramatic rise in the number of unionized employees, and thus of 
collective bargaining agreements.”290 This continued during World War II,291 and greatly increased 
the number of collective bargaining agreements and thus of employers no longer free to fire and 
re-assign workers at will, but instead constrained by CBAs and arbitrators’ interpretations of those 
CBAs.292 In R.W. Fleming’s words, the timing of  
 
[t]he tremendous growth of grievance arbitration . . . is not surprising. Grievance 
arbitration presupposes the existence of collective bargaining agreements. 
Collective bargaining agreements, in turn, presuppose union organization. The 
great growth in the labor movement, especially in the mass production industries, 
occurred in the years following passage of the Wagner Act in 1935.293 
  
As Edwin Witte wrote in 1953, “It is only in the last fifteen years,” (or since 1938) that the number 
of labor arbitrations “has run into the thousands annually.”294 The most important reasons for this 
growth of labor arbitration, Witte wrote, “are the increase in the number of collective-bargaining 
agreements and the inclusion in the great majority of these contracts of provisions for arbitration 
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289 White, supra note 82, at 1085–86. 
 
290 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 32, at 417-18. “Since the percentage of collective agreements containing arbitration 
clauses was also rising, the net effect was to increase the number of arbitrations in the last years before the Second 
World War.” Id. 
 
291 WITTE, supra note 28, at 47. 
 
292 Morton Gitelman, The Evolution of Labor Arbitration, 9 DEPAUL L. REV. 181, 182 (1960) (“With the growth of 
unionism and collective bargaining after the depression, arbitration took on new meaning. . . . Arbitration was 
emerging as a method of interpreting and applying the agreement. This period, between the depression and World 
War II, was the real beginning of grievance arbitration.”). 
 
293 Fleming, supra note 29, at 1246. 
 





as the last step in the settlement of grievances involving the interpretation and application of the 
contract.”295 Nolan and Abrams agree that “American labor arbitration had come of age by 
1941.”296 
 
During the Second World War, the basic trade of CBAs—labor’s no-strike promise in 
exchange for arbitration of grievances—was informally brokered by the War Labor Board.297 
“Besides exercising functions during the War akin to, although not technically arbitration, the 
National War Labor Board did a great deal to foster voluntary arbitration.”298 And to this day the 
federal government supports labor arbitration, with the Federal Mediation & Conciliation Service 
maintaining a roster of arbitrators for labor disputes,299 while no analogous federal agency provides 
a similar service for other arbitration.  
 
 
295 WITTE, supra note 28, at 45. See WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 8, at 206. 
 
Many grievance processes resemble each other and use a stepped procedure progressively elevating 
a grievance to higher levels of decision makers.  For instance, the first step of the process may be 
that the employee informally brings the grievance to the attention of a supervisor. If the supervisor 
is unable to remedy the grievance, then the second step may require that the union shop steward file 
a written grievance with a manager, and that the steward and manager meet within a set short time 
to discuss the grievance and their interpretations of the CBA. If the manager is unable to remedy the 
grievance, then the third step may require that the union president and company president or director 
of labor relations meet. At each step, there may be an informal exchange of documents between the 
parties.  If that third step fails to resolve the grievance, then at the fourth step, the union files for 
arbitration. Some CBAs include time limitations at each step whereas others do not, but may require 
prompt movement from step to step. The period in which to file at each step is often short, varying 
between three to 60 days.  In most instances, the union, rather than the grievant, controls the process, 
so the union decides whether to move the grievance to each successive step and whether to invoke 
arbitration.  
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296 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 32, at 421. See also Gitelman, supra note 292, at 183 (1960) (“By 1941, some 62 
percent of the 1,2000 collective bargaining agreements on file with the United States Conciliation Service contained 
arbitration provisions. The onset of a defense economy and the tremendous increase in defense production in 1940 
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297 Witte, supra note 163, at 57 (“The ‘no-strike’ pledge was an informal promise by unions and employers’ 
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would abide by decisions of the National War Labor Board in settlement of all unresolved labor disputes.”). 
 
298  Id. at 58. See also Fleming, supra note 29, at, 1246 (“During the balance of the war years grievance arbitration 
clauses were included in thousands of agreements, either by direct order of the War Labor Board or because of its 
indirect influence. Although grievance arbitration clauses were included in a great many contracts during the war 
period by government fiat, labor and management grew to accept the practice.”). 
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“The history of labor arbitration is inextricably entwined with that of collective bargaining 
and the broader history of labor.”300 This Article has shown that while a significant amount of 
commercial arbitration occurred at each stage of U.S. history, labor arbitration was extremely rare 
until the 20th century, and remained uncommon until the New Deal of the 1930s. In the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries—amidst vast inequalities of wealth and violent labor disputes—employers 
generally succeeded in maintaining at-will employment by refusing to recognize labor unions, let 
alone agree to unions’ demands to replace at-will employment with arbitration of employee 
grievances. Pre-1930s employer successes in defeating unions were aided by a range of legal 
doctrines from the law of master-servant and tort, to the Sherman Antitrust Act and enforcement 
of workers’ promises not to join unions, to Lochner era constitutional law. And all these doctrines 
were undergirded by a classical liberal emphasis on freedom of contract with respect to the sale of 
labor. 
 
By contrast, the Great Depression combined with the early 20th century ideological shift 
from classical liberalism to progressivism to produce massive legal changes in the 1930s. The key 
legal change was legally-encouraged labor cartelization, the economic policy of the landmark 
Wagner Act of 1935, now known as the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The NLRA’s 
legally-encouraged labor cartelization produced labor grievance arbitration by empowering unions 
to extract from employers the promises—like firing workers only “for cause”—that create the 
claims (grievances) in labor arbitration, as well as employers’ promises to resolve those claims in 
arbitration rather than litigation. And labor grievance arbitration’s roots in legally-encouraged 
labor cartelization largely explain many of labor arbitration’s important differences from other 




Voluntary arbitration and fact-finding are widely used in labor-management relations. The FMCS 
Office of Arbitration provides valuable services for parties seeking arbitration through its roster of 
approximately 1,000 arbitrators. It also oversees the roster to assure compliance with FMCS policies 
and procedures and with the Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-
Management Disputes. 
 
Upon request, FMCS provides panels of arbitrators experienced in labor relations issues, from which 
the parties can select as provided in their collective bargaining agreement or other mutual agreement. 
Requests can be tailored to accommodate a variety of requirements, including for expertise, fees, 
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While private-sector unions, and thus labor arbitration, declined in the late 20th century, 
progressive energy has now returned to labor matters, including their antitrust aspects.302 This then, 
is a good time to absorb lessons from the first big eras of labor and antitrust activism, and hopefully 
this Article has contributed to that end. 
 
 
302 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
 
